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Recent decisions from the U.S. Claims Court, U.S. District
Courts, U.S. Tax Court, and the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have
held that insurance premiums paid by a corporation and its affili-
ates to a wholly- or partially-owned insurance affiliate do not con-
stitute deductible insurance premiums for federal income tax pur-
poses.' In reaching their decisions, these courts have unifolmly
found that captive insurance does not satisfy the federal tax defi-
nition of insurance. They have, however, neither denied the sepa-
rate legal status of the insurance affiliates nor questioned the doc-
trine of separate corporate entities.
These decisions present two central issues. First, according to
these decisions, a contract of insurance between a corporation and
its affiliate that satisfies the private law category of insurance does
not qualify as insurance for federal tax purposes.2 The rationale for
* Assistant Professor, Dickinson School of Law; J.D. 1977, State University of New York
at Buffalo. The author was previously associated with the U.S. Department of Justice,
where he was responsible for the Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States litigation. The views
expressed in this article are those of the author and should not be attributed to the Depart-
ment of Justice.
See Clougherty Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 811 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'g 84
T.C. 948 (1985); Stearns-Roger Corp. v. United States, 774 F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1985), aff'g
577 F. Supp. 833 (D. Colo. 1984); Carnation Co. v. Commissioner, 640 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir.
1981), aff'g 71 T.C. 400 (1978), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981); Beech Aircraft Corp. v.
United States, 1984-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9803 (D. Kan. 1984), aff'd, 797 F.2d 920 (10th
Cir. 1986); Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 555 (1985); Humana, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 1987 Tax Ct. Curt. Reg. Dec. (CCH) Dec. No. 43,666 (Jan. 26, 1987); Anesthesia
Serv. Medical Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 1031 (1985). But see Crawford Fitting
Co. v. United States, 606 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
2 See, e.g., Mobil, 8 Cl. Ct. at 567.
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this conclusion is that insurance for federal tax purposes requires
the transfer of the risk of loss from one party to another, and a
corporation, in reality, does not shift the risk of loss to its affili-
ate.' This theory is based on the well-recognized substance over
form and sham transaction doctrines. These doctrines evolved in
an attempt by tax administrators and courts to cure what was per-
ceived to be abusive tax avoidance.' These doctrines, however, cre-
ate a serious problem for practitioners seeking to distinguish be-
tween legitimate and illegitimate forms of tax avoidance.5
Therefore, simple reliance on these doctrines is inappropriate.
The second central issue of the captive insurance decisions is the
extent of their application to different fact situations. Taxpayers
obviously need to know whether variations in ownership of the
captive insurer or in the nature of the business of the captive in-
surer could produce a different result.
To evaluate the tax treatment of captive insurance transactions
as represented by the recent cases, one should examine the courts'
reliance on the disciplines of economics, insurance, and accounting
and analyze the relevance of these disciplines to proper tax treat-
ment. Specifically, one must understand the business and tax rea-
sons for the widespread use of captive insurance. Moreover, one
must examine the theory of insurance that underlies the courts'
decisions: Is risk transfer always required? Furthermore, one must
consider the effect of basic tax doctrines, such as the substance
over form and separate corporate entity doctrines, on the question
of the validity of captive insurance. A related concern is whether
different factual scenarios, such as when third parties are involved
in a captive insurance relationship, should cause a different tax re-
sult. On one level, the answer to this question depends on the sys-
3 Id.
' This activist role of the courts has been rationalized by one author who is highly critical
of the doctrine: "We must first remember that justification for preventing tax avoidance is
rational and legitimate: the need for protection of the federal revenues by preservation of
public confidence in our system of taxation." Rice, Judicial Techniques in Combating Tax
Avoidance, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 1021, 1051 (1953).
1 As noted by one author: "In spite of all that has been written about the business pur-
pose doctrine, sham transactions, net effect, and the role of the court in looking through
form to find substance, no authoritative, explicit rationale for judicial intervention to frus-
trate plans for tax avoidance has ever been given." Fuller, Business Purpose, Sham Transac-
tions and the Relation of Private Law to the Law of Taxation, 37 Tul. L. Rev. 355, 389
(1963).
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tematic treatment of the theory underlying the courts' view of risk
transfer and risk distribution. On a different level, however, this
underlying theory may be limited in its scope by tax administra-
tors or courts based on a view that factual variants may eliminate
abusive tax avoidance. Finally, one must understand the Code-
based alternatives to dealing with the captive insurance issue. The
remainder of this article will address and analyze each of these
points in order better to understand the central issues of the re-
cent captive insurance cases.
II. OVERVIEW OF CAPTIVE INSURANCE
A. Defining the Captive Insurer
Though the terms captive insurer and captive insurance are
well-recognized terms of art, no court has yet attempted to define
these terms specifically, probably because the issue has been uni-
versally framed in terms of whether transactions actually consti-
tute insurance. A definition is useful, however, in understanding
the nature of the transactions and the possible scope of this issue.
A captive insurer is usually defined in the insurance literature as
"a wholly-owned insurance subsidiary with a primary function of
insuring the outstanding exposures of the parent organization.",
This definition is satisfactory as long as one understands that a
captive insurer may be partially owned and that the term "parent
organization" also includes subsidiaries and affiliates of the cap-
tive's direct owner.
One commentator offers a more comprehensive definition: "[t]he
captive might be generally defined either as an insured controlled
carrier or as a carrier owned by interests owning or controlling the
risks insured therein."'7 This definition (1) expresses the crucial no-
tion of a business enterprise insuring its pure or insurable risks
through an insurance company that it controls through an owner-
ship position and (2) allows for the situation where individuals A
and B together own corporations X and Y, and X insures its risks
with Y. The idea of control can be very broad, but as a tax matter
o Reiss, Captive Insurance Companies, Nat'l Ins. Buyer, July 1960, at 8; see also 1 C.
Williams, G. Head & R. Horn, Principles of Risk Management and Insurance, 139 (2d ed.
1981) [hereinafter C. Williams].
Goshay, Captive Insurance Companies, in Risk Management 84 (H. Snyder ed. 1964).
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it is important that the insured, either directly or indirectly, has a
financial ownership interest in the captive insurer. The concept of
control does add an important element to the definition, however,
for the concept helps distinguish a captive insurer from a mutual
insurance company. In a mutual insurance arrangement, the in-
sured owner's control is practically nonexistent.
B.. Concepts in Business Risk Theory: Why Captive Insurance?
In order to understand fully the tax treatment of captive insur-
ance, it is important to understand the larger role of the captive
insurer in the overall business context. Individuals and businesses
face hazards which expose them to adverse but uncertain financial
consequences. These are known as pure risks or insurable risks. A
business's reaction to these risks is known as the discipline of risk
management. Other than loss control, which is the attempt by the
business enterprise to minimize the potential for adverse potential
losses, the business enterprise faces a decision between two basic
alternatives: either to retain the financial consequences of the loss
exposure or to transfer the financial consequences of the loss expo-
sure to another. Retention is known as self-insurance or non-insur-
ance, which leads to a second decision as to how the losses, if any,
will be funded. Transfer of the financial consequences is insurance,
and insurance automatically provides the answer to funding of the
loss consequences.8
In analyzing the benefits of captive insurance, it must be com-
pared to the two basic alternatives of risk management: self-insur-
ance and insurance. In distinguishing between the benefits of "cap-
tive insurance" and "self-insurance" or "insurance," care must be
taken to identify those benefits that are comparable and do not
present a distinction for choosing between them on the basis of
non-tax business reasons, and those benefits that are clearly
distinct.
8 The definition of insurance as a transfer technique is widely accepted. Thus, insurance
has generally been defined as follows: "From the viewpoint of a risk manager, insurance was
defined as a technique that makes it possible to transfer the financial consequences of
potential, accidental losses from the insured entity, family or individual to an insurer." 1
C. Williams, supra note 6, at 224.
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1. Self-Insurance Versus Captive Insurance
As a mechanism for funding loss consequences, self-insurance
and captive insurance appear to be equally suitable. For example,
whether one voluntarily decides to retain one's risk, or is forced to
because coverage is unobtainable in the marketplace,9 funding loss
consequences through a bank account or a controlled corporation
presents little substantive difference. This conclusion can be illus-
trated through an analysis of risk management.
Risk management describes a person's reaction to the risks he
bears. Of course, a person facing risks may be unaware of the risks
or, being aware, may decide not to do anything about them. This is
risk retention, which can be referred to as non-insurance.
A person may consciously decide to retain the uncertainty of the
financial consequences of the risks he faces and provide for poten-
tial losses by making formal accruals on the company's books or by
actually setting aside funds for future contingencies. Even though
provision has been made for these contingencies, the person still
retains the risks. These active risk retention devices are often
called self-insurance."0
Another risk management technique is the provision for poten-
tial losses through obtaining formal contracts of insurance with
one's wholly-owned insurance affiliate." This is merely another
form of active (non-passive) risk retention, as universally recog-
nized in the theoretical and applied insurance and risk manage-
ment literature. 12 This is because a corporation that places its risks
in an insurance company that it owns, either directly or through its
parent or subsidiaries, is not relieving itself of its financial uncer-
tainty. Through its ownership position, it retains the benefits and
burdens of retaining the financial consequences of its risks. A
' This factor was noted in Stearns-Roger, 577 F. Supp. at 835.
See Goshay, Corporate Self-Insurance and Risk Retention Plans 19 (1964). Goshay
adopted the following definition: "[SJelf-insurance is the conscious retention of risk, the
level of which has been limited within the financial capacity of the firm, emanating from a
distribution of exposures which permit reasonable predictions as to future loss probabili-
ties." Id. at 21.
" See 1 C. Williams, supra note 6, at 135, 139, 224.
See generally P. Bawcutt, Captive Insurance Companies 26 (1982); M. Friedman, Price
Theory 80 (1976); I. Pfeffer, Insurance and Economic Theory 47, 52-53 (1956); 1 C. Wil-
liams, supra note 6, at 135, 139, 224; Friedman & Savage, The Utility Analysis of Choices
Involving Risk in Readings in Price Theory, 57-96 (1952).
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noted insurance scholar has pointed out that "[i]n fact, if self-in-
surance involves the conduct of risk management 'according to all
the sound principles and practices employed by insurance compa-
nies' it might be argued that captive insuring is the epitome of the
self-insurance device.""
There are, however, some practical differences between self-in-
surance and captive insurance where the form of insurance is used.
An enterprise may have better access to reinsurance markets be-
cause unrelated insurers are more comfortable when the primary
coverage is structured in a formal way. Also, where insurance cov-
erage is required in dealings with unrelated parties including gov-
ernmental units, captive insurance may be acceptable whereas self-
insurance may not. Additional advantages may be available for in-
ternational operations of U.S. enterprises, because captive insur-
ance may be treated as insurance in foreign jurisdictions. 14 The
premiums may be deductible for foreign tax purposes, and the flow
of premiums outside the territorial limits of these countries may be
permitted even in countries with currency control laws. Where the
insured is a foreign corporation, U.S. tax may not directly apply to
these transactions, 5 and captive insurance may still be a viable
form in the international setting.
2. Insurance Versus Captive Insurance
Insurance transfers the financial uncertainty about business
risks to another person in exchange for the payment of a premium.
From the insured's point of view, the essential element of the in-
surance transaction is that no matter what insured risks may oc-
cur, the costs are known in advance. For the price of the premium,
13 Goshay, supra note 7, at 85 (footnote omitted).
14 For an examination of the captive insurance issue under British tax law, see Finney,
Captive Insurance Companies: A United Kingdom and United States Perspective, 1980 Brit-
ish Tax Rev. 115 (1985).
For two Canadian cases that dealt with this very issue, see Consolidated-Bathurst, Ltd. v.
The Queen, [1985] 1 C.T.C. 142 (Fed. Ct.) (decision for government); Bonavista Cold Stor-
age Co. v. M.N.R., [1983] C.T.C. 2093 (Tax Rev. Bd.) (decision in favor of taxpayer, on
appeal to Federal Court).
"5 In Mobil, the court found that payments by foreign subsidiaries to a foreign captive
insurance company were not taxable as constructive dividends. Mobil Oil Corp. v. United
States, 8 Cl. Ct. 555, 568 (1985). For the application of Subpart F of Part III of Subchapter




the insured is protected from the financial costs of the risk within
the limits of the policy.
An essential element of insurance is that risks are transferred
from the entity whose activities naturally give rise to the risks to
an entity whose investors accept such risks because of the potential
profit they can earn thereby. Thus, insurers and the persons who
own them are risk takers. They assume the potential financial con-
sequences of risks of others in exchange for a premium payment.
Although a person may be able to predict, with considerable ac-
curacy, his expected losses from risks, he can never know the ac-
tual losses until they occur. So long as the ultimate financial conse-
quences of his risks are not transferred to another, a person
remains the risk bearer. A person can choose to retain the financial
consequences of his risks and predict the costs or attempt in one
way or another to minimize these risks. However, when a person
retains a risk, through self-insurance or captive insurance, there is
always some uncertainty about the actual financial consequences
of the events that may occur at a future date. The only way a per-
son can relieve himself of the financial uncertainty is by entering
into a contract under which an unrelated person (the insurer) will
assume that uncertainty. Of course, the insured must have reason
to believe that the person assuming the uncertainty will have the
ability to honor the contract if the event occurs.
In comparing captive insuring with insuring with an unrelated
party, the perceived advantages include handling otherwise unin-
surable risks and the achievement of broader and deeper coverage.
But the chief perceived advantage of captive insurance is cost re-
duction. If captive insurance is utilized, there is a potential reduc-
tion of the costs of insuring a pure risk for a company with better-
than-average loss experience. In addition, the company benefits
from a potential reduction of non-risk costs, including brokerage
fees, administrative and claims adjustment expenses, and the re-
tention of the potential underwriting and investment profit that an
insurance company retains."6
However, there are also certain disadvantages with captive insur-
ance. Most importantly, the enterprise is fully responsible for the
financial consequences of its risks. Second, a captive must be capi-
" See Goshay, supra note 7, at 110-14; Greene, Tax Problems Relating to Captive Insur-
ers, 18 Forum 253, 254 (1982-83).
1986]
Virginia Tax Review
talized with after-tax funds. This is a problem with self-insurance
as well, to the extent that such capital is necessary to properly pro-
vide for potential financial consequences. Third, a captive, like
self-insurance, requires additional costs to manage the program.
Finally, a captive, unlike a pure self-insurance arrangement, may
be subject to certain excise taxes.1 7 With the exception of this final
item, the major advantages and the disadvantages of captives and
self-insurance versus insurance with an unrelated party are the
same.
C. Tax Accounting for Property/Casualty Insurance
The treatment of the insurance transaction under federal income
tax laws is based on a unique set of rules of accounting for income
and deductions that is highly favorable to both the insured and the
insurance company. Before turning to a broader analysis of the tax
issue, it is proper to focus on the practicalities of tax accounting
for the different methods by which a business may manage the
risks it faces.1"
1. Self-Insurance and Insurance
The tax treatment of self-insurance is well recognized and long
established.19 A taxpayer is not entitled to deduct accruals to a
self-insurance reserve.2 0 However, a taxpayer is entitled to deduct
17 For example, § 4371 of the Internal Revenue Code imposes an excise tax of four per-
cent on insurance and one percent on reinsurance premiums paid to a foreign insurer for
property liability insurance. In a Private Letter Ruling, the Internal Revenue Service con-
cluded that this excise tax is not applicable where a captive arrangement does not create
insurance. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7,904,047 (Oct. 25, 1978).
" For a general discussion of the potential tax advantage in the legal literature, see
Greene, supra note 16, at 255-57; see also Bradley & Winslow, Self-Insurance Plans and
Captive Insurance Companies-A Perspective on Recent Tax Developments, 4 Am. J. Tax
Pol'y 217 (1985); O'Brien & Tung, Captive Offshore Insurance Corporations, 31 Fed. Inst.
on Tax'n 665 (1973).
" For a detailed examination of the authorities, see infra notes 45-58 and accompanying
text.
20 But Congress has long provided special treatment for self-insurance. For example, in
1958 Congress passed an amendment to § 1231 of the Internal Revenue Code to provide
special tax relief for the self-insured. See Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No.
85-866, § 49(a), 72 Stat. 1606, 1642 (now codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1231(a)(4)(C)). As
the Senate Committee on Finance subsequently explained:
The 1958 amendment was enacted to benefit business taxpayers who self-insure
their business properties. Casualty losses on their business properties were excepted
[Vol. 6:267
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losses sustained during the taxable year under section 165 of the
Internal Revenue Code2 when the "all events test" is satisfied;
that is, when the liability is fixed, the amount of the loss can be
determined with reasonable accuracy, and economic performance
has occurred.
22
The amount of the casualty loss that can be deducted under sec-
tion 165 of the Code is limited to the lesser of (1) the difference
between the fair market value of the property before the occur-
rence of the casualty and the fair market value of the property
after the casualty, or (2) the adjusted basis of the property.2
Should there be a total loss, a business taxpayer may take a deduc-
tion for the full adjusted basis.24
A taxpayer who has obtained insurance to cover his casualty
risks, however, receives markedly different treatment under the
tax laws, due to a unique set of rules of accounting for income and
deductions that is highly favorable to the insured and the insurer.
From the viewpoint of the insured, premium payments for prop-
erty and liability insurance are ordinary and necessary business ex-
penses and deductible under section 162 of the Code. This is so
even though the insured may receive claims payments smaller
than, equal to, or even greater than the amount of the premium
from the insurance company. The reason is that by paying the pre-
from Section 1231 (and, thus, are fully deductible against ordinary income) in view of
the fact that amounts added to their self-insurance reserves against casualty losses
are not deductible although premiums paid to an outside insurance company for the
same purpose by business taxpayers who are not self-insurers are deductible.
S. Rep. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 205, reprinted in 1969 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
2027, 2239 (emphasis added).
21 Section 165 provides, as a general rule, that "[t]here shall be allowed as a deduction
any loss sustained during the taxable year not compensated for by insurance or otherwise."
I.R.C. § 165(a).
22 See I.R.C. § 461(h)(1), (4); Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2); see also United States v. Ander-
son, 269 U.S. 422, 424 (1926); Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(b). Specifically, § 461 provides that in
the case of any workers compensation or tort liability, where payment to another party is
required, economic performance does not occur until payment is made. See I.R.C.
§ 461(h)(2)(C).
For a thorough discussion of interpreting the all events test in relation to self-insurance,
see Bradley & Winslow, supra note 18, at 220-26.
1s Tress. Reg. § 1.165-7(b)(1).
14 Id. (flush language). This discussion presumes a taxpayer involved in business or in-
vestment deducting casualty losses under § 165(c)(l)-(2) of the Code. There are special lim-
itations on the deduction of personal casualty losses sustained by individuals. See I.R.C.
§ 165(h).
1986] 275
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mium the insured has transferred the financial uncertainty of its
risks to the insurance company. There is no certainty as to what, if
anything, the insured will receive by way of recovery.
An insurance recovery is gain to the insured under section 61 of
the Code.' Losses of the insured are deductible under section 165
of the Code in the same manner as described for self-insured
losses. To the extent a loss is compensated by insurance, the loss is
not deductible, and the insurance recovery is not income. Thus, for
example, if a person's building worth $100 was completely de-
stroyed by fire, but the adjusted basis of the building was $20, that
person would only be entitled to a loss deduction of $20 under sec-
tion 165.' Should that person have insurance and receive an insur-
ance recovery of $100, the insured would not be entitled to a de-
duction and would have a realized gain of $80, because the
insurance recovery is $80 more than the basis in the property.
Section 1033(a)(2) of the Code, however, permits non-recogni-
tion of gain on the receipt of insurance proceeds if the insured
purchases property similar or related in use to that which was de-
stroyed.27 The self-insured, on the other hand, must use after-tax
dollars to purchase replacement property. However, the insured
will have a substituted basis in the replacement property, whereas
the self-insured will have a new cost basis in the replacement prop-
erty equal to its fair market value. Therefore, in our example
above, the trade-off between insured and self-insured is that the
insured will have a $20 substituted basis in the new asset, whereas
the self-insured will receive a full cost basis of $100 in the new
asset. The insured thus has a lower basis for depreciation purposes
and a built-in deferred potential gain of $80.
2. Captive Insuring
Typically, the insured is only concerned with its own tax treat-
's Section 61 provides, as a general rule, that "[except as otherwise provided . . . gross
income means all income from whatever source derived." I.R.C. § 61(a). Because insurance
recoveries are not excluded from taxation under other Code sections, this general rule sub-
jects such recoveries to taxation.
' See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
27 Section 1033 provides, in pertinent part, that if "the taxpayer . . . purchases other
property similar or related in use to.. . [the insured property that was lost],. .. the gain
shall be recognized only to the extent that the amount realized . . . [from insurance pro-
ceeds] exceeds the cost of such other property." I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2)(A).
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ment and not with the tax treatment of the insurance company.
When the insured owns the insurer, however, the insured is di-
rectly concerned with the tax treatment of insurance companies,
and tax accounting for property casualty insurance companies
presents some major differences from accounting for other
corporations.
Stock casualty and property insurance companies are generally
taxable as other corporations under the Code.28 There are, how-
ever, two essential differences: (1) the manner in which insurance
companies compute their gross income, and (2) the manner in
which deductible losses from underwriting (as opposed to invest-
ment) are computed. Each of these differences will be discussed in
turn.
Gross income to an insurance company includes only such in-
come from premiums that has been "earned" during the taxable
year.2' Thus, premiums attributable to a period of time after the
close of the taxable year are not included in gross income for that
year even though received by the insurance company. These
amounts are classified as a reserve for unearned premiums.
Losses that are deductible by insurance companies cover a wide
variety of contingent liabilities under section 832(b)(5). As the In-
ternal Revenue Service has noted: "Losses incurred . .. include
liability for claims reported, whether adjusted, in the course of ad-
justment, or resisted, as well as the liability for claims arising dur-
ing the taxable year but not reported."30 Thus, insurance compa-
nies are permitted to set up reserves for contingent liabilities
including reported (whether or not they will be paid) and unre-
ported claims ("made on the basis of the facts in each case .. .
and the company's experience with similar cases"),31 and deduct
these reserves as losses during a taxable year.32
See I.R.C. § 831.
SI.R.C. § 832(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.832-4. However, § 832(b) was amended by the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 to provide that only 80% of unearned premiums is excluded from in-
come. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1021(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2395 (to be
codified at I.R.C. § 832(b)(4)(B)).
S0 Rev. Proc. 75-56, 1975-2 C.B. 596, 596.
1 Id. at 597.
32 Id. However, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 amended § 832(b)(5)(A) and added new
§ 846 to require discounting to present value for insurance losses. See Tax Reform Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1023, 100 Stat. at 2399-2404 (to be codified at I.R.C.
§§ 832(b)(5)(A), 846).
1986]
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In contrast, the general rules of tax accounting prohibit the
deferral of an item of income when the earning of the income will
take place in a later taxable year, even though deferral would be in
accord with sound accounting practice.3 Similarly, the general
rules of tax accounting prohibit the deduction of future estimated
expenses even when such deduction is in accordance with sound
accounting practice."
The foregoing sets forth some of the tax accounting advantages
afforded insurance transactions, both to the insured and the in-
surer. Because of these advantages, a captive insurance arrange-
ment is not a simple "wash" between income and deductions of the
related insured and insurer. If the companies were consolidated for
income tax purposes, there would still be substantial deferral of
tax obligation with regard to the insured and insurer as compared
with a self-insurance scheme.
Many captive insurance companies, however, are not incorpo-
rated in the United States, but in foreign jurisdictions. These cap-
tive insurers could not file consolidated returns with their parent
corporation. 5 However, many U.S.-owned captive insurers are in-
corporated in countries which impose little or no income taxes.3
Thus, these captive insurers relinquish some of the advantages of
See, e.g., Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963); American Automobile Ass'n v.
United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961); Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
34 Section 461(h)(1) provides that the all events test is not satisfied until economic per-
formance occurs. I.R.C. § 461(h)(1); see supra note 22 and accompanying text; see also Sim-
plified Tax Records v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 75, 82 (1963).
Congress at one time enacted and quickly repealed §§ 452 and 462 to allow businesses to
use a reserve method. See Act of June 15, 1955, § 1, 69 Stat. 134, 134 (repealing §§ 452,
462). One of the reasons for these sections was to allow the deduction of reserves for "cer-
tain liabilities for self-insured injury and damage claims." H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. A163, reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4017, 4301; S. Rep. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 306, reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4621,
4946. The ability to deduct self-insured losses has thus tightened considerably over the
years, from the reserve method briefly allowed by §§ 452 and 462 to the present-day re-
quirement of the all events test and economic performance. See supra notes 20-22 and ac-
companying text.
Generally, only United States corporations which are property casualty insurance com-
panies can be included in a consolidated income tax return. This is the result of the defini-
tion of includable corporations for consolidated return purposes, which includes all corpora-
tions (80% or more owned) except certain life insurance companies, mutual insurance
companies, and foreign corporations. See I.R.C. § 1504(a), (b)(2), (3).
" See, e.g., 2 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 617 (1986). Barbados is one
such country, where incorporation of captive insurance companies is popular.
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tax accounting for insurance companies (but their parent compa-
nies relinquish none of the advantages of tax accounting for the
insured), in exchange for minimal local income tax and the deferral
of U.S. income tax liability. The computation of these affiliates'
taxable income under the rules of tax accounting for insurance
companies would still be important, however, for purposes of Sub-
part F of the Code, which deals with the taxation of the sharehold-
ers of controlled foreign corporations. The accounting principles
for insurance companies outlined above are equally valid for Sub-
part F purposes."
The tax deferral due to foreign incorporation of a captive insur-
ance company, however, can have a negative impact where a cap-
tive insurer incurs an overall loss. A U.S. insurance company can
utilize a loss in determining its U.S. income tax consequences. A
foreign insurance company, however, not being a U.S. taxpayer,
cannot utilize losses to offset U.S. income. On the other hand, a
corporation deducting premiums paid to its foreign captive insur-
ers would obtain an after-tax profit when little or no loss occurs
caused solely by the federal tax savings. Thus, the foreign insurer
presents less certain, but potentially much greater, tax advantages
than a domestic captive insurer, depending on the actual conse-
quences of the group's losses. 3' The tax advantages of foreign cap-
tives, however, may be largely illusory for years governed by the
Subpart F provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.'0
III. INSURANCE: RISK TRANSFER AND THE COURTS' APPROACHES
Section 162(a) of the Code provides for the deductability of all
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxa-
ble year in carrying on a trade or business. Treasury Regulations
provide that among the allowable business expenses are insurance
premiums against losses due to fire, storms, theft, accident, or
37 I.R.C. § 953. For a discussion of Subpart F of Part III of Subchapter N of the Code
and its application to the captive insurance issue, see infra notes 211-34 and accompanying
text.
3 This discussion has largely ignored the presence of non-loss costs (like administrative
expenses) on the assumption that the non-loss costs associated with self-insurance and cap-
tive insurance will be similar, and that they are deducted by the self-insured directly and by
the captive insured through the premium payment. For many property casualty lines these
costs are often minimal, as was the case in Mobil. See Mobil, 8 Cl. Ct. at 559.
11 See infra notes 211-34 and accompanying text.
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similar losses suffered by a business.40
Although the term "insurance" is not defined in the Code, two
well-established principles determine whether a transaction cast in
the form of insurance actually constitutes insurance for federal tax
purposes. First, the Supreme Court held, in Helvering v. Le
Gierse,1 that a transaction must involve risk transfer and risk dis-
tribution to constitute insurance for tax purposes.42 Second, sums
set aside pursuant to a self-insurance plan are not deductible in-
surance expenses.4s Not only is there no risk transfer in a self-in-
surance plan, but sums set aside are not business "expenses," since
the taxpayer retains a proprietary interest in the fund and the
"payments" are merely a reserve for future contingent liabilities. 4
This follows even when the funds are transferred to and adminis-
tered by an independent agent or insurance company.'
6
An important feature of court cases dealing with self-insurance
is that they do not represent an application of the doctrine of sub-
stance over form. Indeed, the courts dealt directly with the actual
form of the situation. The treatment of self-insurance represents
the application of accepted theory to the accrual of expense deduc-
tions under the all events test. Also, when considering the alter-
nate theory of the courts that there is no risk shifting in a self-
insurance plan, one readily sees that there is no transfer of any-
thing where the taxpayer merely accrues an expense on its books,
and there is no risk being transferred even where third parties are
involved because the third parties have not accepted the conse-
quences of the risk but have merely accepted the responsibility for
managing the funds. With self-insurance, there is no need to deter-
mine the reality behind the form because the form itself expresses
the actual intention of the parties and leads to the proper tax re-
sult. Captive insurance, on the other hand, employs a form which,
if accepted, requires a different tax result.
" Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a).
41 312 U.S. 531 (1941).
" Id. at 539-40.
3 See, e.g., Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 43 F.2d 78, 80 (10th Cir. 1930), cert.
denied, 284 U.S. 654 (1931).
44 Id., 43 F.2d at 79.
" See, e.g., Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States, 577 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 946 (1978); Spring Canyon Coal, 43 F.2d at 78.
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A. Risk Transfer and Risk Distribution
1. The Le Gierse Opinion
The analysis of Helvering v. Le Gierse involved an application of
the familiar tax doctrine of substance over form. In that case, an
elderly woman entered into two contracts with an unrelated insur-
ance company.46 The first contract was a $25,000 life insurance
policy naming the insured's daughter as beneficiary, for which the
insured paid a single premium of $22,946. As a condition to the
issuance of the life insurance policy, the insurance company re-
quired the insured to purchase, for a single premium of $4,179, an
annuity contract providing annual payments of $589.80 for life.47
The effect of the annuity and insurance policies was that the one
neutralized the actuarial risk customarily inherent in the other.
The insured died within a month of the purchase of these policies
and the question presented was whether the proceeds of the
$25,000 life insurance policy were "insurance" and thus exempt
from the federal estate tax."
In determining whether the proceeds received constituted insur-
ance, the Supreme Court viewed the life insurance policy and the
annuity policy as part of one plan and concluded, since the annuity
contract neutralized the risk customarily inherent in a life insur-
ance contract, that they were not insurance .4  According to the
Court, the proceeds of a life insurance policy could only constitute
an amount receivable as insurance, if they were received as a result
of a transaction involving an actual risk, since "[h]istorically and
commonly insurance involves risk-shifting and risk-distributing." 0
Le Gierse is also an example of the application of the step trans-
action doctrine, enunciated later by the Supreme Court in Com-
missioner v. Court Holding Co.51 The essence of the doctrine is
that "several transactions should be treated as one where, on an
objective view of what took place, they could be said to be interde-
pendent."52 The insured in Le Gierse, although entering into a for-
46 312 U.S. at 536.
4' Id. at 537.
48 Id.
" Id. at 541.
" Id. at 539.
6- 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
62 Rice, supra note 4, at 1046.
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mal contract of life insurance with an insurer, did not in reality
transfer the actuarial risk to the insurer, so the contract did not
constitute insurance for federal tax purposes.53
2. Revenue Ruling 77-316
The Service relied upon Le Gierse and the self-insurance analy-
sis in its first formal pronouncement on captive insurance in Reve-
nue Ruling 77-316.14 This Ruling held that insurance did not exist
between a parent (or affiliates) and its wholly-owned captive.5
The Ruling considered three situations in which a parent corpora-
tion and its subsidiaries had entered into formal insurance con-
tracts with a wholly-owned insurance subsidiary: first, direct insur-
ance between operating companies and their insurance company;
second, indirect insurance between operating companies and an
unrelated insurance company that reinsured a portion of the risk
with the taxpayer's wholly-owned insurance affiliate; and finally,
direct insurance between operating companies and their wholly-
owned insurance affiliate that reinsured a significant portion of the
risks with an unrelated insurance company. 56 With respect to the
risks carried or retained by the wholly-owned insurance affiliate,
the Ruling found that: "In each situation described, the insuring
parent corporation and its domestic subsidiaries, and the wholly
owned 'insurance' subsidiary, though separate corporate entities,
represent one economic family with the result that those who bear
the ultimate economic burden of loss are the same persons who
suffer the loss. ' ' 57 Because of this finding, the Ruling concluded
that risk transfer and risk distribution were not present under
these circumstances.
58
3. The Captive Cases: Risk Transfer Focus
Courts have largely ignored the economic family terminology of
Revenue Ruling 77-316 and have primarily focused on the concept
" 312 U.S. at 541.
" 1977-2 C.B. 53.
" Id. at 53. For a discussion of the historical development by the Service of this view, see
Greene, supra note 16, at 257.
" 1977-2 C.B. at 53-54.
11 Id. at 54.
" Id. at 55.
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of risk transfer. The results, however, have been the same. Courts
have uniformly found that risk transfer is not accomplished where
the insured wholly owns (either directly or by reason of its affilia-
tion with the owner) the insurer.
The underlying rationale of these cases is that the arrangements
were not insurance because risk was not transferred. 0 The results
are based upon the courts' conclusions about the fundamental eco-
nomic reality of the transactions."' A related conclusion running
through recent court opinions is that captive insuring is merely a
self-insurance device."2 The insurance and economics literature
fully supports these views.63
The quintessential difference between a captive insurance trans-
action and an insurance transaction is that the person who owns
the insurer does not shift his uncertainty to another; he still re-
tains the full uncertainty he had before the affiliate issued a for-
mal contract of insurance." Whatever the financial consequences,
the person bears them through his ownership position. This person
has not parted with a premium, nor with the financial conse-
quences of the risk; the true insured has parted with both. More-
over, in recent cases these differences were clearly recognized in
" See cases cited supra note 1. For a discussion of two cases where only partial ownership
was present, see infra notes 157-75 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Stearns-Roger Corp. v. United States, 774 F.2d 414, 415 (10th Cir. 1985) (self-
insurance does not constitute insurance because there is no shifting of risk to others).
" In four cases, the government offered the testimony of Dr. Irving H. Plotkin, Vice-
President of Arthur D. Little, Inc., on the theories and practicalities of insurance applicable
to captive insurance. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 797 F.2d 920, 922 (10th Cir.
1986); Stearns-Roger Corp. v. United States, 577 F. Supp. 833, 835 (D. Colo. 1984), aff'd,
774 F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1985); Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 555, 563 (1985);
Humana, Inc. v. Commissioner, 1987 Tax Ct. Curr. Reg. Dec. (CCH) Dec. No. 43,666, at
2704-06 (Jan. 26, 1987). In Mobil, Dr. Plotkin "was qualified as an expert on the economics
of insurance." 8 Cl. Ct. at 563.
See, e.g., Stearns-Roger, 774 F.2d at 416. The Tenth Circuit stated:
The parent in the case before us did not receive protection that would have been
provided by "insurance." The reality of the transaction has to be recognized. The
comparison of the arrangement here made to self-insurance cannot be ignored. The
parent provided the necessary funds to the subsidiary by way of what it called "pre-
miums" to meet the casualty losses of the parent. The subsidiary retained these funds
until paid back to the parent on losses. This does not appear to have different conse-
quences than did the payments in Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 43 F.2d
78 (10th Cir. 1930).
Id.
" See sources cited supra note 12.
" See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
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reports prepared by corporate risk managers advising management
of its options. For example, in Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States, 5
an employee explained:
Approaches to insurance can be roughly categorized as outside
insurance, self insurance and nonlinsurance. Outside insurance, of
course, refers to covering insurable risks by paying a premium to a
non-affiliated insurance company in return for an agreement that
the insurance company will indemnify the insured for losses suf-
fered. Self insurance is usually handled by setting aside premiums
out of current earnings into a reserve for self-insurance; losses are
charged against this reserve. Self-insurance can also be worked
through an insurance affiliate. Under this system, operating sub-
sidiaries pay premiums to an affiliated insurance company. Non-
insurance means that no provision at all is made for the insurable
risks concerned."
4. Net Worth Variant to the Risk Transfer Focus
Some courts have taken a related but somewhat different ap-
proach to the analysis of risk transfer. They have concluded that
an examination of the economic reality of the transaction as re-
flected in the net worth of the participants shows a lack of risk
transfer. For example, as noted by the trial court in Beech Aircraft
Corp. v. United States:
An attempt by a parent corporation to transfer risk to a subsidi-
ary by a contract of insurance does not succeed in doing so as a
matter of economic reality. This is because the same related eco-
nomic family continues to be responsible for the actual losses that
occur. Where the relationship of parent and captive entity exists,
as here, the risk becomes a paper transfer and the actual loss expe-
rience reduces or increases the net worth of the subsidiary and the
net worth of the parent reflects the reduction or increase in the
value of its subsidiary on the parent's balance sheet. It is conceiva-
ble, though unlikely, that if no losses were encountered, the deduc-
tion of purported insurance premiums could become a tax loophole
for the parent company.67
68 8 Cl. Ct. 555 (1985).
" Defendant's Exhibit No. 7, app. 2, at 1, Mobil, 8 Cl. Ct. 555 (No. 358-78) (reprinting
Adams, Economics of Self Insurance, in An Insurance Program for Mobil Overseas (1958))
(copy on file).
47 1984-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9803, at 85,404 (D. Kan. 1984), aff'd, 797 F.2d 920 (10th
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The net worth analysis is based in part on the actual way the
accounting profession treats captive insurance for financial report-
ing purposes. Neither self-insurance nor captive insurance has any
effect for financial accounting purposes; only actual losses are
taken into account.68 This position is based on the accounting pro-
fession's view of the practicalities of risk retention and risk trans-
fer. According to the Financial Accounting Standards Board
("FASB"), neither self-insurance nor captive insurance is insur-
ance.69 This position recognizes the basic distinction between risk
retention and the transference of risk through insurance with an
independent insurer.7 0 Additionally, the FASB concludes that
neither self-insurance nor captive insurance eliminates or protects
an enterprise from risk: "Insurance or reinsurance reduces or elim-
inates risks and the inherent earnings fluctuations that accompany
risks. Unlike insurance and reinsurance, however, the use of 'ac-
counting reserves' does not reduce or eliminate risk.
1
The net worth analysis is also a reflection of a common sense
approach to the effect on an insured of captive insurance. An in-
sured who obtains insurance from an unrelated insurance company
and a person who obtains a formal contract of insurance from an
insurance affiliate face profoundly different practical situations. In
Cir. 1986); see also Clougherty Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 811 F.2d 1297, 1305-06 (9th
Cir. 1987).
a Under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP"), a business enterprise is
not permitted to accrue contingent liabilities unless it is probable that an asset has been
impaired or a liability has been incurred and the amount of the loss can be reasonably
estimated. See Accounting for Contingencies, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
No. 5, 7 8 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1975) [hereinafter FASB Statement No. 5].
FASB Statement No. 5 recognizes that the absence of insurance for casualty risks "consti-
tutes an existing condition involving uncertainty about the amount and timing of any losses
that may occur, in which case a contingency exists." Id. at T 27. FASB Statement No. 5
further provides that: "Uninsured risks may arise in a number of ways, including (a) nonin-
surance of certain risks or coinsurance or deductible clauses in an insurance contract or (b)
insurance through a subsidiary or investee to the extent not reinsured with an independent
insurer." Id. (footnote omitted).
Usually, a company will be required to report an investment in a subsidiary using the
consolidated method of accounting where more than 50% of the voting stock of the subsidi-
ary is owned by the parent. See ARB No. 51, Consolidated Financial Statements 11 1, 2
(1959). The equity method of accounting for investments in common stocks is presumed to
be applicable where the investment is 20% or more of the voting stock. APB Opinion No.
18, The Equity Method of Accounting for Investments in Common Stock 7 17 (1971).
69 See FASB Statement No. 5, supra note 68, V 27.
70 Id. at 1 61, 66.
Id. at T 65.
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an unrelated situation the insured has transferred the financial
consequences of potential casualties to an unrelated party. Thus,
the insured is basically indifferent from a financial viewpoint as to
whether or not he suffers a loss because he will be reimbursed in
accordance with his insurance policy. The premium payment is
spent in exchange for peace of mind. Because the premium has
been spent, he is in the same economic position whether or not he
suffers a loss and is reimbursed for it.
The person who obtains a formal contract of insurance from a
captive, however, is not indifferent from a financial viewpoint. He
has a direct financial stake in whether a loss occurs and a claim
payment is made because both the premium payment and risk are
within the same economic family. Without a loss, he does not re-
ceive a claim payment, but the captive and the group still have the
premium. With a loss, the "insured" affiliate receives a claim pay-
ment, but the group's premium or capital that was used to pay the
claim has been consumed in making the "insured" affiliate "even."
Only the effects of the actual loss by the "insured" affiliate will be
directly reflected in the parent's books. In essence, the payment of
the premium by the "insured" affiliate and the receipt of the pre-
mium payment by the insurance affiliate cancel each other; this
group is left with the potential for actual casualties and the finan-
cial consequences of those potential casualties.7 2
5. Implications
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, only when a firm obtains
real insurance are its financial costs independent of whether or not
the peril actually comes to pass. The firm's costs are equal to the
insurance premium and, within the policy's limits, are known in
advance with certainty. Just the opposite is true with any form of
self-insurance: the actual costs to the firm are a direct, dollar-for-
dollar function of what perils in fact come to pass and what their
financial consequences turn out to be.
The obvious conclusion from this analysis is that courts are cor-
rect in concluding that in reality captive insurance transactions are
not insurance .7 The question remains whether this reality should
72 For an elaboration on the comparison between insurance and self-insurance, see supra
text accompanying notes 15-17.
71 See cases cited supra note 1.
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be adopted for tax purposes. The focus of analysis for economics is
normally the concept of the "firm": a total enterprise composed of
all related entities. The accounting profession also focuses on an
economic enterprise as a whole." ' Taxation, however, adopts as its
starting point the view that the separately incorporated compo-
nents of a firm or an economic enterprise are separate taxpayers. 5
Thus, tax law cannot blindly follow the position of other disci-
plines, such as economics or accounting, without justifying this ap-
proach in terms of the fundamental principles of taxation. Just as
important for the integrity of our tax system, however, is that tax
law should face the consistent approach taken to captive insurance
by other disciplines and the inherent practicalities underlying
these approaches. The analysis of fundamental tax principles, and
their application to the captive insurance situation, is a task to
which we now turn.
IV. SEPARATE CORPORATE ENTITY AND ECONOMIC REALITY
Courts have uniformly held that where a parent or its affiliates
have entered into a formal contract of insurance with an insurance
company that it wholly or substantially owns, risk transfer, and
hence, an insurance relationship, has not been established.78 More-
over, as has been pointed out, this conclusion is solidly supported
by the commonly understood view found in the insurance, econom-
ics, and accounting literature that the captive insurance arrange-
ment is a risk-retention device and does not create an insurance
relationship. This conclusion is based on the factual premise of
an ownership relation between insured and insurer. This position,
however, must be reconciled with the doctrine of separate corpo-
rate entities.
78
The courts, however, have dismissed any conflict. The most com-
plete articulation of this view is found in the Tax Court's opinion
in Clougherty Packing Co. v. Commissioner:
There are numerous situations in the tax law, both statutory and
case law, where the separate nature of the entity is not disregarded
7' See supra note 68.
71 See, e.g., Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
" See cases cited supra note 1.
7 See supra notes 8-17 & 68-72 and accompanying texts.
78 See infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
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but the transaction, as cast between the related parties, is reclassi-
fied to represent something else, e.g., reasonable compensation or
dividend, loans or contributions to capital, loans or dividends, de-
posits or payments, or other recharacterization such as permitted
under section 482 . . . .We have done nothing more ...but to
reclassify, as nondeductible, portions of the payments which the
taxpayer deducted as insurance premiums but which were received
by the taxpayer's captive insurance subsidiaries."
To taxpayers who have questioned the government's position in
many forums, this statement may appear somewhat conclusory
since it deals with what is essentially the heart of the taxpayers'
cases. It does, however, identify the crucial issue: the relationship
between the doctrines of separate corporate entities and substance
versus form as it applies to this issue.
A. Basic Tax Principles: Separate Corporate Entities Doctrine
The doctrine of separate corporate entities has as its focus the
determination of who is the proper taxpayer, a corporation or the
interests that own it. Such cases as Moline Properties, Inc. v. Com-
missioner,80 and National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner,"1 have
established the essence of the doctrine: whatever the purpose for
organizing a corporation by the taxpayer, "so long as that purpose
is the equivalent of business activity or is followed by the carrying
on of business by the corporation, the corporation remains a sepa-
rate taxable entity. 8 2 Moline Properties thus established the prin-
ciple that business activities can be divided between related enti-
ties and this will be respected for tax purposes.8 3 Moreover, not
even the government can disregard a corporate entity and tax a
shareholder on the profits attributable to the business activity of
his corporation.
79 84 T.C. 948, 960 (1985), aff'd, 811 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1987). The Ninth Circuit stated
that its holding does not ignore the separate legal status of the captive insurer. See 811 F.2d
at 1305, 1307; see also infra note 140.
80 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
81 336 U.S. 422 (1949).
*, Moline Properties, 319 U.S. at 438-439. In Moline Properties, the question presented
was whether the taxpayer corporation could exclude realized capital gains of the corporation
and include them, instead, in the income of its sole shareholder. The Court, agreeing with




B. Basic Tax Principles: Substance Over Form And Sham
Transaction Doctrines
The doctrinal approach to taxation described above does not re-
quire that the government be bound by the form that taxpayers
employ for transactions between related entities, whether individ-
ual or corporate. In National Carbide, the Supreme Court applied
general assignment of income principles to determine which "sepa-
rate corporate entity" should be taxed on the income.8 Further,
the courts have long employed the substance over form and sham
transaction doctrines8 5 in examining the tax consequences of trans-
actions between related parties. These doctrines essentially provide
that in certain circumstances, the form of a transaction will be re-
cast by the courts so that the tax consequences will comply with
the true substance or economic reality of the transaction.
An understanding of when courts will employ these doctrines be-
gins with the practical reality that "[tihe whole purpose of having
any doctrine at all is to prevent tax avoidance."8 6 Thus, the appli-
cation of the doctrines depends upon the perception by the tax
administrator and the courts that the taxpayer is attempting to
take advantage of some anomaly in the tax system that produces a
favorable tax result, and resort to this doctrine depends in the first
instance upon the discretion of the tax administrator. The pres-
ence of tax avoidance motivation, however, does not provide a ba-
sis for distinguishing between the legitimate and illegitimate trans-
actions, because it is recognized that tax avoidance motivation is to
be disregarded unless a statutory provision makes it a relevant
inquiry.87
Since tax avoidance motivation is to be disregarded, what is the
relevant inquiry for the courts? Once a court has determined the
336 U.S. at 436.
" The government has apparently not argued that the insurance affiliates are sham cor-
porations, perhaps because such an argument would narrowly define the situations its posi-
tion would cover, i.e., making the argument inapplicable where the insurance affiliate ac-
cepts the risks of unrelated parties. See infra notes 173-210 and accompanying text. The
effect, however, of disqualifying the transactions as insurance where the captive insures the
risks of the parent organization may be to rob the captive of any business purpose. To date,
however, it does not appear that the government has sought the reallocation of the invest-
ment profits from the captive to the parent.
S6 Rice, supra note 4, at 1035.
7 See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). Sections 269 and 482 are examples of




a preliminary question to be answered is whether the. . . form put
forward by the taxpayer or other parties is really intended as such,
or whether he or they may have intended a different legal structure
in reality, in which case the nominal . . . form is not congruent
with the economic and social reality, and another . . . form must
therefore replace the former."
Such a situation exists where the court discovers the presence of
facts normally not part of the formal arrangement that demon-
strate the invalidity of the formal arrangement. This is in essence
the notion of a sham transaction.
The case of F.R. Johnson Products Co. v. Commissioner" illus-
trates this approach. There the taxpayer entered into health insur-
ance contracts on behalf of its employees with its wholly-owned
captive. The court, however, examined the actual conduct by the
parties and noted two important facts: (1) the taxpayer "never at-
tempted to accumulate the necessary cash reserve to conduct such
a business";90 and, (2) the taxpayer never actually "paid any insur-
ance premiums." 9' The arrangements were obviously shams and
the court concluded that the transactions were not insurance.92
A related problem is found in Carnation Co. v. Commissioner
where the insured guaranteed the integrity of an insurance com-
pany." A guarantee indicates that the insured and the insurer did
not really intend to transfer any risk. The actual conduct of the
parties was therefore not in accordance with what is expected of an
insurance arrangement, so the transaction was simply a sham.9 ,
Thus, sham situations may exist in the insurance context where an
insurance company is not receiving premiums and paying claims in
accordance with the contract,95 does not have sufficient capital to
cover the risks accepted, 96 or has protection in the form of a guar-
" 1 Rotterdam Institute for Fiscal Studies, International Tax Avoidance 200 (1978).
89 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 705 (1982).
" Id. at 719.
91 Id.
" Id.
" 640 F.2d 1010, 1012 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981).
Id. at 1013.
" See, e.g., F.R. Johnson Products, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) at 718-19.
See, e.g., Beech Aircraft, 1984-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9803, at 85,404 (D. Kan. 1984)
(mentioning the lack of proper capitalization as a factor), aff'd, 797 F.2d 920 (10th Cir.
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antee of the loss exposures formally transferred.97
Most captive insurance arrangements presented to the courts
cannot be so easily resolved. Most cases present situations where
the financial facts, including the formal insurance arrangements
and the actual conduct of the parties, are openly presented to the
tax authorities, and the actual conduct of the parties formally com-
plies with the insurance form. Simply put, the taxpayer carefully
ensures that the transactions and the insurance affiliate comply
with sound insurance practice. Where the form and the actual in-
tent of the parties appear to be congruent, the issue becomes
whether the forms openly presented conceal the true economic re-
ality that would require a different tax result.
In order to gain a sense of where this aspect of the doctrine of
substance over form will prevail, one must examine the principal
cases in this area. In Gregory v. Helvering,"' the taxpayer had
caused her corporation to spin off certain assets into a newly-
formed corporation, which was then promptly liquidated.9 9 The
Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether this trans-
action was a tax-free reorganization, where the taxpayer had for-
mally complied with the definitional sections in the Code.100
Though it was clear that the transaction had been structured solely
for tax reasons, the Court recognized that tax motivation is to be
disregarded if a reorganization in reality was effected. The Court,
however, held that the reorganization was not effective, in spite of
technical compliance with the statute.101
1986).
97 See, e.g., Carnation, 640 F.2d at 1013.
- 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
" Id. at 467.
100 Id. at 469.
n0 Id. Writing for the Second Circuit panel that considered Gregory, in a famous passage
Judge Learned Hand said:
We agree with the Board [of Tax Appeals] and the taxpayer that a transaction,
otherwise within an exception of the tax law does not lose its immunity, because it is
actuated by a desire to avoid, or, if one choose, to evade, taxation. Any one may so
arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose
that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to
increase one's taxes. . . . Nevertheless, it does not follow that Congress meant to
cover such a transaction, not even though the facts answer the dictionary definitions
of each term used in the statutory definition. It is quite true, as the Board has very
well said, that as the articulation of a statute increases, the room for interpretation
must contract; but the meaning of a sentence may be more than that of the separate
19861
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The Court's approach was to interpret the statute in light of its
purpose. It found in the statute an essential requirement that a
reorganization requires a business purpose, which was not readily
perceived from the literal language of the statute."2 Thus, the
transaction in question was not a reorganization "because the
transaction on its face lies outside the plain intent of the statute.
To hold otherwise would be to exalt artifice over reality and to
deprive the statutory provision in question of all serious
purpose."103
In Higgins v. Smith,'0° the Court amplified this approach. The
government had disallowed a claimed loss deduction on the sale of
securities to a taxpayer's wholly-owned corporation.'0 The corpo-
ration had been in existence for a number of years, and the govern-
ment neither challenged the corporation's "separate existence" nor
the price at which the sale had taken place. 0 6 Instead, the govern-
ment's contention, and the Court's holding, was that the loss had
not been "sustained" within the meaning of the Code, because the
taxpayer maintained control of the stock through his ownership of
the corporation, and there was not "enough of substance in such a
sale finally to determine a loss.
''107
In Crosby Valve & Gage Co. v. Commissioner,'" a subsidiary of
a charitable organization had made a "charitable contribution" to
its parent. The question presented was whether the subsidiary was
entitled to a charitable contribution deduction for its payment.'"
The First Circuit, recognizing that the taxpayer had complied with
the literal language of the Code for deductibility, nevertheless held
that the payment was not a charitable contribution but a dividend
payment." 0 Reviewing the charitable contributions tax scheme, the
court determined that it was not Congress' intent to confer a de-
words, as a melody is more than the notes, and no degree of particularity can ever
obviate recourse to the setting in which all appear, and which all collectively create.
Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
"'1 293 U.S. at 469.
103 Id. at 470.
o 308 U.S. 473 (1940).
'0 Id. at 475.
106 Id. at 476.
107 Id.
108 380 F.2d 146 (1st Cir. 1967).
109 Id.
110 Id. at 148.
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duction in this situation." 1
C. Application of Tax Principles to Captive Insurance
The inquiry, therefore, is to determine whether the substance or
the reality of the transaction was within Congress' intended mean-
ing. In Gregory v. Helvering, the Court concluded that a transac-
tion that lacked a business purpose could not be respected for tax
purposes."' Thus, in examining captive insurance, one level of in-
quiry is to determine whether a business purpose, other than tax
motivation, exists for setting up and entering into a transaction
with an insurance affiliate.
Captive insurance is superior to normal self-insurance for several
business reasons." 3 Captive insurance provides the form that legit-
imizes the transfer of funds among related entities and answers the
concerns of third parties that the separate legal entity has ade-
quate resources to cover potential losses. These reasons are related,
however, to the overall business goal of captive insurance. This
overall business purpose must be evaluated in its practical eco-
nomic context. The objective of captive insurance is to conduct a
risk-retention program according to the sound principles of insur-
ance operations, while at the same time acknowledging that the
financial responsibility for those risks is retained. The business
purpose for captive insurance is to self-insure intelligently and to
provide funding for loss exposures.
Typically, insurance affiliates are set up primarily to handle the
exposures of the parent organization. Often, however, the insur-
ance affiliate will insure the risks of unrelated parties. Certainly,
insurance of unrelated parties supplies a sufficient business pur-
pose for recognizing the reality of the insurance affiliate. However,
the business purpose for the parent organization in insuring with
its insurance affiliate, which is to carry out a risk-retention scheme
for its own risks, does not change due to the "reality" of the affili-
ate's organization.
The presence of a business purpose for a transaction, however,
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the form of a
transaction will prevail. A different level of inquiry into legislative
1 Id.
... 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
"I See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
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intent is to examine the object of the statute either standing
alone' 14 or in the context of other Code provisions.115 Certainly, in
Higgins v. Smith, there may have been a business purpose for the
transfer of the securities from the taxpayer to the corporation, be-
cause the corporation probably used them in its trade or business
of buying and selling securities. " ' The Court, however, found that
only losses sustained could be deducted, without regard to the bus-
iness purpose of the transaction.
1 7
Captive insurance is analogous to the situation in Higgins be-
cause deduction of premiums depends on section 162 of the Code,
which requires an ordinary and necessary expenditure incurred
within the taxable year.118 An insurance premium is consideration
for the promise by the insurer to pay for incurred losses within the
limits of the policy. The insured has, in effect, fixed its loss by the
amount of the premium. The amount of the loss from any casualty
covered by the contract will be no greater or less than the amount
of the premium.119 Arguably, the insurance premium payment,
viewed as a prepaid loss, has not been "sustained" within the
meaning of Higgins when paid to an insurer the insured owns be-
cause of the latter's continued control of the fund. This compari-
son does suggest that captive insurance does not present the sub-
stance that Congress intended in section 162.
A better perspective on this issue, however, may be derived from
the general teachings and approaches of the cases previously dis-
cussed. In general, courts have focused on statutory provisions and
found that the substance of the transaction did not comport with
the statutory intent.120 Of utmost importance is the courts' reliance
on the fact that the taxpayers were related by ownership. 21 Tax-
"' See, e.g., Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940).
,1 See, e.g., Crosby Valve & Gage Co. v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 146 (1st Cir. 1967).
"6 308 U.S. at 474.
" Id. at 475-76.
"8 Deductible trade or business expenses are defined as "all ordinary and necessary ex-
penses paid or incurred during the taxable year." I.R.C. § 162(a).
'9 See supra paragraph in text following note 15.
,20 See supra notes 98-111 and accompanying text.
"I The cases discussed supra at notes 98-111 and accompanying text focused on transac-
tions involving related parties. The doctrine of substance over form is not so limited, how-
ever. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966). There, an interest
deduction was denied because the court found that the whole transaction lacked any realis-
tic expectation of an economic profit. In reaching this conclusion, the court remarked: "[a]
close question whether a particular Code provision authorizes the deduction of a certain
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payers have argued that the doctrine of separate corporate entities
requires the fact of ownership be disregarded, and that the sub-
stance of the transaction be examined on the basis of a presump-
tion that the insurance contract was in reality between unrelated
parties."' 2 In both Higgins and Crosby Valve & Gage Co. v. Com-
missioner, however, the fact of ownership was the only fact neces-
sary for those courts' decisions. '2  Thus, when analyzing the eco-
nomic reality of transactions between related parties, a court need
not ignore the essential fact of relation.
Captive insurance requires a somewhat different method of in-
terpretation, however. Gregory, Higgins, and Crosby Valve & Gage
Co. dealt with income tax terms: "reorganization," "loss sus-
tained," and "charitable deduction.' 24 These concepts are statu-
tory creations; they do not derive their meaning from any real
world context. In the captive insurance arena, however, a court
must measure the transactions being examined against tax provi-
sions that draw their content from life. As noted before, tax law
permits a deduction for insurance payments, but the term "insur-
ance" is not defined in the Code or Treasury Regulations.' 25 "In-
surance" is not a statutory term of art, but a term descriptive of an
important aspect of economic life. An obvious conclusion would be
that tax law would only allow a deduction for insurance premiums
that satisfy accepted definitions of insurance.
An aspect of the real world is, of course, the legal form in which
captive insurance is couched. Even in a legal context, however, it is
recognized that insurance requires a transfer of risk. In determin-
ing whether a group health insurance plan was insurance regulated
by the District of Columbia Code, the court in Jordan v. Group
Health Association12 found that insurance required risk transfer.
item is best resolved by reference to the underlying congressional purpose of the deduction
in question." Id. at 741.
" See, e.g., Plaintiff's Post-Trial Brief at 24, Mobil, 8 Cl. Ct. 555 (1985) (No. 358-78)
(copy on file).
"' Higgins, 308 U.S. at 476 ("[T]his domination and control is so obvious in a wholly
owned corporation as to require a peremptory instruction that no loss in the statutory sense
could occur upon a sale by a taxpayer to such an entity."); Crosby Valve & Gage, 380 F.2d
at 149.
"' Higgins, 308 U.S. at 475; Gregory, 293 U.S. at 468-69; Crosby Valve & Gage, 380 F.2d
at 147.
'" See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
12 107 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (opinion by Rutledge, J.).
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Because the plan did not transfer risk, it was not insurance. 127 In
its opinion, the court considered the definition of insurance or of
indemnity:
While the basic concepts are not identical and each has varied legal
usages, they have common and primary elements which are con-
trolling here. Fundamentally each involves contractual security
against anticipated loss. Whether the contract is one of insurance
or of indemnity there must be a risk of loss to which one party may
be subjected by contingent or future events and an assumption of
it by legally binding arrangement by another. Even the most
loosely stated conceptions of insurance and indemnity require
these elements. Hazard is essential and equally so a shifting of its
incidence. If there is no risk, or there being one it is not shifted to
another or others, there can be neither insurance nor indemnity.
Insurance also, by the better view, involves distribution of the risk,
but distribution without assumption hardly can be held to be in-
surance. These are elemental conceptions and controlling ones. 28
The Supreme Court has focused on similar characteristics in cases
dealing with the question of what constitutes "business of insur-
ance" within the meaning of federal antitrust laws. 129 In this con-
text, the Court considered the question of transfer and distribution
of risk to be crucial to a determination of the existence of the
"business of insurance."130
D. Taxpayer Arguments Based on Tax Principles and
Governmental Response
Though general theories of economics and insurance deny that
captive insurance arrangements are insurance, tax law will not nec-
essarily follow this position if it conflicts with tax law doctrine. Al-
though ownership is sometimes taken into account under the doc-
trine of substance over form,13' the parameters of this approach
present difficult questions in view of the doctrine of separate cor-
porate entities. An examination of two principal arguments of tax-
payers illustrate this problem.
117 Id. at 245-47.
IU Id. at 245 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982); Group Life and
Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
130 Union Labor, 458 U.S. at 127-28; Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 220-21.
"' See, e.g., supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
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1. Taxpayers' First Argument
Taxpayers typically characterize a captive insurance transaction
as an actual transfer of the financial consequences of risk to the
captive insurer, and argue that the government is attributing risks
that are now the risks of the captive insurer back to the share-
holder-insured. The contention that the captives' risks are being
attributed to the insured is supported in one analysis advanced in
Carnation Co. v. Commissioner.13 2 In that case, the court looked at
two principal agreements: first, the insurance contract purporting
to shift the risk to Carnation's captive; and second, an agreement
to the effect that the insured would provide additional capital to
the captive (up to a total of $3 million) on request.33 The court
viewed this combination as "neutralizing" the risk.34 The focus of
risk neutralization is on the affairs of the captive, finding that the
captive bears no overall risk because the insurance risk is offset by
the ability to obtain additional funding from the insured. There-
fore, from the insured's point of view, the insurable risk that it had
rid itself of was offset by its investment risk in the captive.135 The
court's theory, however, is an application of the sham doctrine,
which is only the first level of inquiry into the substance of a
transaction, and represents an understanding that the private in-
tent of the parties was not congruent with the form of risk transfer
in which the transaction had been clothed. ' s'
There are, however, certain limitations to this approach. First,
there was no attempt in Carnation to determine as a factual mat-
ter whether the investment risk was actually equivalent to the in-
surance risk.1 37 Would an obligation to provide a little additional
capital be sufficient as the basis for concluding that the parties'
private intent was not to shift the risk? Second, since the guaran-
tee represented an investment risk, it does not appear to be quali-
132 640 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981).
133 Id. at 1012. There were actually three agreements viewed by the court, the third being
the agreement with the fronting insurance company. This last agreement has been ignored
in this analysis for reasons of simplicity.
'" Id. at 1013.
135 Id.
13' Although the Supreme Court in Le Gierse spoke in terms of risk transfer and risk
distribution, that case could also be analyzed as a risk neutralization problem. Helvering v.
Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 539 (1941).
137 See Carnation, 640 F.2d at 1010-13.
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tatively different from the risk borne by the captive's owner with
respect to the investment already put into the captive. For exam-
ple, there appears to be no difference between putting $3,000,000
in the captive initially, and putting $120,000 in the captive initially
and obligating oneself to put in an additional $2,880,000 if needed.
This requirement can be easily circumvented, and courts after
Carnation have found that its absence has no effect on the issue
where 100% ownership is present. s Indeed, although there was a
guarantee in Stearns-Roger Corp. v. United States, both the dis-
trict court and the Tenth Circuit ignored its presence in reaching
their decisions."3 9
Courts have essentially adopted the conclusions described above
based on the characterization that in a captive insurance situation
there is no validity to the transfer of the risks from insured to in-
surer, 1" so there is no question of any attribution of the insurer's
risks. In other words, this characterization looks at the operations
of the insured corporation and asks the question whether it has
transferred the financial consequences of its own casualty risks
which are attributable to its own business activities.
Different conceptual characterizations may appear to be mere
semantic gamesmanship. Starting points are important, however,
and this one is crucial to understanding this issue. To taxpayers,
the issue is whether the captive insurance company is a viable in-
surance company following sound insurance practices. If so, the in-
tercompany transactions are insurance from the perspective of the
insurance company. The government and the courts, however, as-
Is$ See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 1984-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9803, at
85,404 (D. Kan. 1984), aff'd, 797 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1986); Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States,
8 Cl. Ct. 555, 566 (1985); Humana, Inc. v. Commissioner, 1987 Tax Ct. Curr. Reg. Dec.
(CCH) Dec. No. 43,666, at 2699 (Jan. 26,1987); Clougherty Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 84
T.C. 948, 958-60 (1985), aff'd, 811 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1987).
:so 774 F.2d 414, 417 (10th Cir. 1985).
10 See, e.g., Clougherty Packing, 811 F.2d at 1305. The Ninth Circuit concluded that:
In reaching our holding, we do not disturb the separate legal status of the various
corporate entities involved, either by treating them as a single unit or otherwise.
Rather, we examine the economic consequences of the captive insurance arrangement
to the "insured" party to see if that party has, in fact, shifted the risk. In doing so, we
look only to the insured's assets, i.e., those of Clougherty, to determine whether it has
divested itself of the adverse economic consequences of a covered workers' compensa-
tion claim. Viewing only Clougherty's assets and considering only the effect of a claim
on those assets, it is clear that the risk of loss has not been shifted from Clougherty.
Id.; see also cases cited supra note 1.
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sume the existence of a valid insurance company. 14 1 To them, the
issue is whether the financial consequences of the insured's risks
have been transferred to another.
142
This position is sounder. Since the question in these cases is
whether the insured is entitled to a deduction for insurance, the
proper focus should be on the insured. While the sham transaction
doctrine might well focus on the validity of the insurance company
as a corporate entity, the doctrine of substance over form looks
squarely at the economic effect of the transaction on the taxpayer
claiming the desired tax treatment.
2. Taxpayers' Second Argument
The second major prong of the taxpayers' attacks on the govern-
ment's position is based on the way the tax law normally views
intercompany transactions. When one focuses on transactions be-
tween related parties, one finds that many transactions-such as
sales and loans-are normally respected for tax purposes. 14 How-
ever, this is not always true. In the case of loans, for example, there
are many cases which deal with the question of whether a transac-
tion labelled a loan is, in fact, a capital contribution.14 4 Transac-
tions between related entities are always subject to an examination
to see whether the form chosen by the taxpayer comports with eco-
nomic realities. 45 The crucial difference between general related
entity transactions and captive insurance transactions, according
to the government's theory, is that the latter are never economi-
cally valid. 46 This position is the heart of the captive insurance
controversy.
Non-insurance transactions are essentially respected because
they represent the division of the aspects of a business enterprise
among related, but separate corporate entities. This approach com-
141 See, e.g., Stearns-Roger, 774 F.2d at 415.
141 See cases cited supra note 1.
"I See generally B. Bittker & J. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and
Shareholders, 1.05, 4.02 (4th ed. 1979).
'4 See, e.g., Texas Farm Bureau v. United States, 725 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1984); Lane v.
United States, 724 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1984); Tyler v. Tomlinson, 414 F.2d 844 (5th Cir.
1969). See generally Plumb, The Federal Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt: A
Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26 Tax L. Rev. 369 (1971).
4I See generally B. Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note 143, 1.05, 4.02.
146 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53.
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ports with the policy behind allowing taxpayers to avail themselves
of the recognized form of corporate or multiple corporate enter-
prise. 147 Since transactions are respected as long as they are bona
fide, it is obvious that the tax attributes of the transaction must
follow. For example, where property is sold to a related corpora-
tion, all the tax consequences of profit or loss follow because the
transferee becomes the owner and the bearer of the risks associ-
ated with that property. Thus, an uncertain casualty risk can be
transferred for tax purposes to a related entity so long as that
transfer is subsumed in a bona fide transfer of the asset, 48 because
the transferee bears all of the benefits and burdens of ownership.
The government argues, however, that an economic enterprise
cannot place its entire casualty risk exposure in an arm of the en-
terprise and have that action respected for tax purposes.14 9 In that
case, the taxpayer is trying to separate the financial consequence
of the pure risk of casualty loss that is an attribute of its business
activity. According to the government, the only recognized form of
accomplishing such a separation is insurance, which cannot be ef-
fectuated between parties related by ownership.1 50 To better un-
derstand the government's position, the theory underlying it will
now be examined in detail.
If one examines pure risk, rather than the financial conse-
quences of the risk, one can readily see that a corporation can
never transfer pure risk to another, unless the corporation trans-
fers the business activity or property that occasions the risk. It
would be a significant business achievement if a business enter-
prise could place all of its exposure to the casualty risks or liabili-
ties in another corporation and thereby limit its liability to the
amount of its investment in that other corporation. But a corpora-
tion always remains liable for the risk exposure occasioned by the
business it operates.
The only recognized way of separating the financial conse-
See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
148 See Rink v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 746 (1969); Sas-Jaworsky v. Commissioner, 24
T.C.M. (CCH) 630 (1965), aff'd per curiam, 379 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1967). The courts deter-
mined that it was the corporate property owners, not the shareholders, that were entitled to
casualty or other loss deductions with regard to the corporations' properties used in its
businesses.




quences of risk exposures from the risk exposures themselves is
through the risk transfer device of insurance. When dealing with a
related insurance affiliate, however, the insured corporation cannot
say that its financial risk, and therefore its potential loss, are lim-
ited by the transaction.151 Nor can it say that its financial exposure
is limited to its investment in a separate corporate entity, its insur-
ance affiliate; on the contrary, its exposure to financial loss is inde-
pendent of its investment. Indeed, the more capital the enterprise
puts in its insurance affiliate, the more likely that capital will be
consumed in making good the actual financial losses; the less capi-
tal the enterprise puts in its insurance affiliate, the more likely
that the insurance affliate will be unable to make good on the ac-
tual financial losses.
The taxpayers' characterization of the government's argument as
dependent on the concept of risk neutralization' 2 is incorrect.
Where a parent sells property to its subsidiary and receives pay-
ment, it has practically separated this property from its business.
Indeed, the parent still has an interest in the property, but this is
solely an investment interest in the subsidiary. This transfer can
have significant practical implications, for example, if the use of
this property by its subsidiary caused injury to third parties. While
the subsidiary would be liable for the damages caused, the parent
would only be liable normally insofar as its investment is at risk.
On the other hand, if the parent retains the property and the casu-
alty occurs, where the parent insures with its captive, the parent's
loss exposure is not limited to its investment in its captive.
While a sale between related entities carries with it an actual
physical transfer of property and its consequences, insurance is
based on the transfer of the financial consequences of pure risk.
Insurance is different from a sale or other transactions and is
unique because the transaction can only be understood in financial
terms. In addition, insurance deals solely with the downside of
business activities. There is no benefit from having a casualty risk
related to one's business; either a loss does not occur or, if it oc-
curs, the consequences are always negative. This is quite unlike
other business activities, because other activities provide the op-
portunity for profit in addition to a risk of loss.
"' See supra notes 15-17 & 64-66 and accompanying texts.
152 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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Insurance is therefore unique in that it is the mechanism for
transferring a feature of business which has only negative implica-
tions. When a business has obtained insurance, it has quite clearly
separated these negative financial implications from its operations.
However, when a corporation retains the risk either directly or
through its insurance affiliates, the corporation has not separated
these negative financial implications from its operations.
Courts have agreed with the government's position on the cap-
tive insurance issue based on the practical and theoretical concepts
discussed above. In fact, the Mobil court stated: "Insurance is a
unique risk transfer device. Other situations involving transfers be-
tween related corporations which are acceptable for tax purposes
are not relevant [to the insurance situation]. '"153
V. CAPTIVE INSURANCE AND UNRELATED PARTIES
The focus of the issue so far has been on situations where a par-
ent company (or its affiliates) insures with a captive that is 100%
owned. In this situation, courts have focused on one element of the
definition of insurance, risk transfer, and have found it to be
lacking.
However, third parties, which are unrelated to the insured by
stock ownership, may be involved in the situation. An appropriate
question to be examined at this point is the effect of this involve-
ment on captive insurance arrangements. Two separate third party
situations will be analyzed: third-party involvement in ownership
of the captive insurance company; and, third-party insureds of the
captive insurance company.
A. Third-Party Ownership
As a general proposition, a party who enters into a contract of
insurance with an unrelated insurance company has shifted the
risk of loss to another.154 If, however, the unrelated insurer acts as
a fronting company and reinsures part or all of the risk with the
insured's captive, the agreements of insurance and reinsurance will
be viewed together."5 To the extent that the captive reinsures the
153 8 C1. Ct. at 564.
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Carnation Co. v. Commissioner, 640 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
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insured's risks, there will be no risk transfer. Under Revenue Rul-
ing 77-316 and the court cases, however, insurance exists when the
risk is retained by an unrelated fronting company or is reinsured
by the captive with an unrelated insurer. 56
What happens, however, when the captive is only partially
owned by the insured and the balance is owned by interests unre-
lated to the insured by stock ownership? This question was not
addressed in the Service's original position on captive insurance in
Revenue Ruling 77-316. Only two cases to date have dealt with
captive insurers where outside ownership was present. s7 In Beech
Aircraft, the district court recognized the presence of outside own-
ership, but found the unrelated owners' participation in the insur-
ance program to be insignificant.6 8 It is apparent from the rest of
the opinion that the court viewed the captive as wholly-owned by
Beech Aircraft.
The second case to deal with this factual situation was Crawford
Fitting Co. v. United States,5 which was decided in favor of the
taxpayer. In Crawford Fitting, the insured corporate taxpayer
(Crawford) did not have a direct ownership interest in the insur-
ance company. Crawford was wholly-owned by an individual (Len-
non) who had varying partial ownership interests in four corpora-
tions which together had an 80% ownership interest in an
insurance company (Constance). The balance of the four corpora-
tions was owned by Lennon's wife and daughter."" The remainder
U.S. 965 (1981); Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 555 (1985); Rev. Rul. 77-316,
1977-2 C.B. 53.
'" See Carnation, 640 F.2d at 1013; Mobil, 8 Cl. Ct. at 567-68; Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2
C.B. at 54.
"' Two articles have suggested that the Mobil case also dealt with a partially-owned cap-
tive. See Fogarisi & Renfroe, Deductibility of Payments to Captive Insurance Companies
Revisited But New Questions Raised-Mobil Oil Corporation v. United States, 14 Tax
Mgmt. Int'l J. 358, 361 (1985); Bradley & Winslow, supra note 18, at 243 n.88. This charac-
terization, however, is incorrect. One of Mobil's four captives, Westchester Insurance Com-
pany, Ltd., was acquired by Mobil in 1962. Prior to its acquisition, Westchester had been a
subsidiary of Standard-Vacuum Oil Company, which had been owned jointly by Mobil and
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. The Mobil case did not involve Westchester prior to
its acquisition by Mobil. See 8 Cl. Ct. at 563.
'" Beech Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 1984-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9803, at 84,401
(D. Kan. 1984). In Beech Aircraft, the district court found that 11,000 shares out of the
120,000 outstanding of the captive were owned by "six other concerns or individuals, most
of whom were affiliated with Beech." Id.
" 606 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
'00 Id. at 137.
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of Constance (20%) was owned by individuals who were not re-
lated to Lennon, but who had a business relationship with the tax-
payer Crawford. Thus, Lennon, the 100% owner of Crawford,
owned indirectly (by virtue of his ownership interest in the four
corporations) 44.02% of the insurance company. 16'
The court noted that the different ownership relations were cru-
cial to whether the taxpayer had obtained insurance and found
"that the taxpayer and the other shareholders of the captive insur-
ance company, as well as the insureds, are not so economically re-
lated that their separate financial transactions must be aggregated
and treated as the transactions of a single taxpayer, the plain-
tiff."' 62 After examining the ownership relations outlined above,
the court found "these above related alterations of fact to be so
significantly different from the situations set forth in the above
cited cases and in Revenue Ruling 77-316 that they change the
characterization of the 'insurance premiums,' and the tax treat-
ment accorded them, in those cases and that ruling." e3
Statements in the court's opinion suggest several different con-
clusions about the legal significance of the ownership factor in de-
termining whether an insurance relationship has been established.
Recognizing that the corporate taxpayer was not the parent of the
insurance company nor the owner of other corporations that owned
the insurance company could lead to the conclusion that only affil-
iated groups of corporations are affected by this issue.' 64 This
would mean that where individual A insures with his wholly-owned
corporation X, then insurance and risk transfer would occur. Obvi-
ously, the economic analysis is not so limited. 65
The more important conclusion in Crawford Fitting is that the
court considered the insurance company to have been essentially
owned by different individual taxpayers whose interests could not
be aggregated for purposes of the economic analysis. This was a
"I Id. at 137-138. A Canadian captive insurance case considered a similar ownership pat-
tern. See Bonavista Cold Storage Co. v. M.N.R., [19831 C.T.C. 2093 (Tax Rev. Bd.).
606 F. Supp. at 145.
Id. at 146.
' Id. at 146-47.
See Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940). Without expressing an opinion on the cor-
rectness of the reasoning or result in Crawford Fitting, the Ninth Circuit indicated that this
distinction between corporations and individuals "may seem artificial." Clougherty Packing
Co. v. Commissioner, 811 F.2d 1297, 1304 (9th Cir. 1987).
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rejection of the government's position that relied on an expanded
view of an economic family including human and corporate coun-
terparts.'" The court's rejection of the government's attribution
argument is understandable, since the government did not provide
any statutory or non-statutory authority for its position.
167
The court's view of the ownership factor in Crawford Fitting is
analogous to the Service's position in Revenue Ruling 78-338, upon
which the Court relied. 6 8 In that Ruling, the Service reviewed a
situation in which there were thirty-one owner-insureds, including
the taxpayer. Because no owner had a controlling interest in the
insurer, or individual risk coverage in excess of five percent, the
Service found that the premiums paid by the taxpayer were de-
ductible ordinary and necessary business expenses under section
162.169
In comparing the situations involved in Crawford Fitting and
Revenue Ruling 78-338, there are some important distinctions not
recognized by the court. In Crawford Fitting, Lennon's direct and
indirect ownership interests were 100% of Crawford, and 44% of
Constance, without attributing to him the indirect ownership of his
spouse and daughter, which accounted for another 36% of Con-
stance. Forty-four percent is not a controlling interest as a matter
of numbers, but on reviewing the facts, Lennon owned controlling
interests (more than 50%) in three corporations that owned 60%
of the stock of Constance. 1 0 Thus, Lennon, the sole owner of the
taxpayer, had practical control over the insurer, even without attri-
bution of the ownership interests of other members of his family.
,' 606 F. Supp. at 141.
16' See I.R.C. § 267. Section 267 is an example of a Code-based attribution rule for the
purpose of postponing or denying deductions for transactions between related parties. Sec-
tion 267 applies to losses from the sale or exchange of property between related parties and
the timing of provisions for expenses incurred between related parties. The objective of the
timing provisions is to defer deductions until the income is included by a related person. In
a captive insurance arrangement the premium payment could represent unearned premium
income to the insurer. The language of the Code, however, speaks of a situation where the
amount "is not (unless paid) includible in the gross income of such person." I.R.C.
§ 267(a)(2)(A). In a captive insurance scenario, however, the premium is not excluded from
income because it has not been paid (because it has), but because of special features of
insurance accounting. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text. Thus, § 267 does not
appear to apply to captive insurance arrangements.
14 See 606 F. Supp. at 146.
"' Rev. Rul. 78-338, 1978-2 C.B. 107, 107-108.
170 606 F. Supp. at 137-38.
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The court nevertheless concluded that the transactions were in-
surance in their totality.17 1 While the positioning of the line drawn
by the court greatly differed from that of the Service, this view was
consistent with the all-or-nothing approach taken in Revenue Rul-
ing 78-338. The government in Crawford Fitting had similarly ad-
vocated an all-or-nothing approach.
Neither approach is entirely satisfactory, however. The error in
both approaches is that the concept of economic family is no more
than a question of ownership, and that the presence of insurance
depends on actual risk transfer.172 Viewing the ownership criterion
as a matter of economics, risk has been retained and risk transfer
has not been accomplished to the extent that the insured owns or
constructively owns the insurer. Just as important, however, is the
fact that risk has not been retained and risk transfer has been ac-
complished to the extent that the insured does not own or con-
structively own the insurer, and the unrelated ownership of the in-
surer is bona fide. Bona fide ownership requires the unrelated
owners to be risking their proper percentage of capital in the en-
terprise, and there must be sufficient capital in terms of the risks
borne by the insurance company.
The court's and the government's approach in Crawford Fitting
views the insurance contract as a unit, and insurance depends on
whether the risk has been essentially transferred. This unitary ap-
proach is not consistent with other cases. In other cases, where the
risk is subdivided among insurance companies, the insurance con-
tract is broken into parts. 7 Thus, where the risk is insured with
an unrelated fronting company, reinsured with a wholly-owned
captive, and reinsured with an unrelated insurance company, the
contract is treated as insurance to the extent and only to the ex-
tent a portion of the risk (and the premium) is retained by wholly
unrelated parties.17" There is no reason why this approach, based
.. Id. at 145.
12 The Service's Chief Counsel recommended that no appeal be initiated in Crawford
Fitting because the record did not disclose that Lennon had de facto ownership of the inter-
ests of his wife, daughter, employees, and the outside attorney. Furthermore, the record
suffered "from the absence of expert opinion evidence regarding the meaning of 'insur-
ance.'" Action On Dec. CC-1986-007, Crawford Fitting Co. v. United States (Jan. 8, 1986).
This view is in keeping with the following analysis.
17 See supra note 155.
M7 See supra note 155.
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on a consistent and correct view of risk retention and risk transfer,
should not be applied to the Crawford Fitting situation of partly-
owned captives. The proper and consistent approach should be
that insurance is not created to the extent of the percentage of
ownership by the insured of the insurer.
But the application of this approach is not entirely free from
judgment calls. There may be a point at which the insured-owner's
ownership interest is so small that it is not administratively practi-
cal to bifurcate the transaction into insurance and risk retention.
In that situation, the insurance policy should be viewed as being
insurance in its entirety. Owner-insureds of mutual insurance com-
panies exemplify this problem and its resolution. The question re-
mains as to how much partial ownership will trigger the proper
approach discussed above.
The line-drawing problem in this situation essentially involves
the self-imposed administrative or judicial limitations on the doc-
trine of substance over form. Revenue Ruling 78-338 provides a
rough answer to this question. In that Ruling, the Service sug-
gested a limitation on the resort to the substance over form analy-
sis in this context, based on factors such as the number of owner-
insureds, the percentage of each insured's portion of the entire risk
of the insurance company, and the absence of control by any in-
sured. 175 This Ruling provides that these factors should guide the
Service in deciding to stop examining the substance of the insur-
ance arrangements based solely on the principles of ownership.
B. Third-Party Insured-Risk Transfer and Risk Distribution
To examine the effect of third-party insureds of the captive in-
surance company on the concept of insurance, one must begin with
the concept of risk distribution. According to the Le Gierse analy-
sis, risk distribution, or risk pooling, is an essential element of an
insurance arrangement. 176 Obviously, risk distribution is the es-
sence of the practical way insurance companies handle their expo-
sures to retained risk.
Where a captive insurer accepts and retains risks of parties un-
related to the economic family, it could be said that risk distribu-
1978-2 C.B. at 108.
See Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 539 (1941).
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tion should be effectuated as a matter of federal tax law. Risk dis-
tribution, however, is only one element of the definition of
insurance. The crucial issue involving third-party insureds is
whether the presence of third-party risks retained by the captive
converts the relation between parent and captive into insurance.
That is, does risk distribution effectuate risk transfer?
The question of risk distribution has not been of much impor-
tance in reported cases. Although Revenue Ruling 77-316 found
that risk distribution is not present where the captive insurer
solely insures the risks of the economic family, 177 no majority opin-
ion has yet dealt with that issue, since the courts have focused
solely on risk transfer. 178 To date, only three reported cases have
involved the presence of third-party insureds in a situation where
the captive insurer was 100% owned, 17 19 and none of the courts
found this factor significant.
The typical fact pattern in these cases involved insureds who
had a business relation to the economic family and the economic
family paid the premium for the coverage. In Stearns-Roger, the
taxpayer was required by contract to insure project customers' 80
in Humana, the taxpayer insured employee-doctors,' 8' and in Mo-
bil, the captives insured third parties in various situations." 2 In
7 1977-2 C.B. 53, 54.
178 A concurring opinion in Clougherty Packing Co. v. Commissioner viewed the parent
company as having transferred its risks, but found that risk distribution was not present
where the only insured was the parent of the captive. 84 T.C. 948, 963 (1985) (Hamblen, J.,
concurring).
In Bonavista Cold Storage Co. v. M.N.R., a Canadian case cited previously, the Tax Re-
view Board found adequate risk distribution on the basis of the number of risks insured
even though all of the risks borne by the captive were those of one corporate taxpayer. See
[1983] C.T.C. 2093, 2110 (Tax Rev. Bd.).
"' Stearns-Roger Corp. v. United States, 774 F.2d 414, 415 (10th Cir. 1985), aff'g 577 F.
Supp. 833 (D. Colo. 1984); Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 555, 566 (1985);
Humana, Inc. v. Commissioner, 1987 Tax Ct. Curr. Reg. Dec. (CCH) Dec. No. 43,666, at
2703 (Jan. 26, 1987).
ISO 577 F. Supp, at 834.
1987 Tax Ct. Curr. Reg. Dec. (CCH) at 2702.
8' Cl. Ct. at 561-62. According to the Claims Court:
These parties included: "parties that had a business relationship with a Mobil com-
pany," "corporations which were owned in part by parties unrelated, directly or indi-
rectly, to Mobil by stock ownership," "unincorporated ventures in which a Mobil af-
filiate and one or more parties unrelated by stock ownership to Mobil were
participants," "builders all risk policies issued in the names of Mobil affiliates and
the affiliate's contractors," "insurance or reinsurance covering property belonging to
employees of Mobil and its affiliates," "marine cargo shipments for the account of
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Stearns-Roger and Humana the courts apparently did not regard
the business as a true unrelated business or unrelated independent
risks, for in Stearns-Roger the trial court found that the captive
was not engaged in the business of insuring others,183 and in
Humana the court found that the coverage "was clearly an integral
part of the protection of the parent 'corporation" and its
subsidiaries.
' e184
In Mobil, however, one captive insurer truly issued third-party
insurance. Bishopsgate Insurance Co., Ltd. ("Bishopsgate") was an
insurance company acquired by Mobil long after its incorporation.
Bishopsgate had issued, and continued to issue, policies to unre-
lated parties.' In fact, during most of the pertinent years, third-
party insurance represented the majority of Bishopsgate's business
in terms of risks insured and retained by that company.18
Most of Bishopsgate's Mobil risks were those of Mobil's foreign
affiliates. These risks were predominantly reinsured with either
Mobil's Bahamian captive, General Overseas Insurance Co.
("GOIC"), or its Bermuda captive, Bluefield Insurance, Ltd.
("Bluefield"). It was GOIC and Bluefield that reinsured the risks
of Mobil's U.S. affiliates.1 87 Moreover, according to the govern-
ment's brief, the only genuine third-party business undertaken by
GOIC and Bluefield was the reinsurance of some of the unrelated
party risks of Bishopsgate, which amounted to approximately 1.1%
of earned premiums for the former two companies.' 188
unrelated parties where Mobil Oil was selling the products shipped," "premiums
ceded by Bishopsgate to GOIC and Bluefield that were attributable to fire insurance
and fire reinsurance written by Bishopsgate."
Id.
183 577 F. Supp. at 838.
184 1987 Tax Ct. Curr. Reg. Dec. (OCH) at 2703.
185 8 Cl. Ct. at 562-63.
Id. at 556 n.1. In Plaintiff's Requested Findings of Fact, essentially unobjected to by
the government, the plaintiff alleged that "the percentage of Bishopsgate's total net earned
premiums that was attributable to . . . unrelated parties was at least 60% in 1964, and
exceeded 50% in 1965, 65% in 1966, 90% in 1967, and 90% in 1968." Plaintiff's Requested
Findings of Fact at No. 155, Mobil, 8 Cl. Ct. 555 (No. 358-78) (copy on file); Defendant's
Objections to Plaintiff's Requested Findings of Fact at 46 (copy on file).
' 8 Cl. Ct. at 561-62. The insurance issue in Mobil only affected Mobil's foreign affiliates
to the extent that the government contended that the premium payments were a construc-
tive dividend to the parent corporation. The issue was resolved by the court in favor of the
taxpayer. See supra note 15.
1" Brief for the United States at 90.
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The court in Mobil did not discuss the effect of third-party busi-
ness, other than as a factual matter, even though the issue was
briefed in considerable detail by the parties.189 The court found
that risk transfer was lacking and that "[i]nsurance through a
wholly-owned insurance affiliate is essentially the same as setting
up reserve accounts." 190 Thus the court apparently viewed risk
transfer as non-existent, irrespective of the presence of third-party
insureds.'9
In contrast to the cases discussed immediately above, Crawford
Fitting Co. v. United States dealt not only with third-party owner-
ship but also with third-party insureds. In Crawford Fitting, the
court found that risk transfer had been accomplished because of
the differences in ownership, and that risk distribution was effec-
tuated by the insurance company by combining the risks of the
taxpayer-insured with the risks of unrelated parties.192 The court
held that "the plaintiff did shift the risk of loss outside its eco-
nomic family to the captive, who fairly and adequately distributed
the risk of loss among its group of insureds.' s9 3 Therefore, it is
apparent that the Crawford Fitting court treated risk transfer and
risk distribution as separate concepts.
Informal opinions of the Service imply that an insurance trans-
action can be effectuated between 100%-owned affiliated compa-
nies where the affiliated insurance company also accepts "substan-
tial" insurance risks of unrelated parties, 9 4 but these opinions
never define what constitutes "substantial" unrelated business. 9
19 See Plaintiff's Post-Trial Brief at 44-51; Brief for the United States at 73-91.
190 8 Cl. Ct. at 567.
191 Accord Bradley & Winslow, supra note 18, at 242. It is also possible that the Claims
Court viewed the reinsurance of the unrelated risks of another captive as related risks. As
noted, according to the government's position these were the only genuine unrelated risks
distributed with Mobil's U.S. corporations' risks. See supra note 188 and accompanying
text.
191 606 F. Supp. 136, 148 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
193 Id.
194 See Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,136 (Oct. 12, 1979) (and the attachment thereto), rev'd, Gen.
Couns. Mem. 39,247 (June 27, 1984); Off. Mem. 19,167 (Sept. 28, 1979); Priv. Ltr. Rul.
8,250,021 (Sept. 20, 1982); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,215,066 (Nov. 25, 1981); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,111,087
(Dec. 18, 1980); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7,904,047 (Oct. 25, 1978); see also Greene, supra note 16, at
262-64.
19' All that is really known about the Service's concept of "substantial" is that 3% of
unrelated party business is not substantial and that 51% of unrelated party business may
not be substantial. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7,904,047 (3%); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,215,066 (51%).
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These opinions are based on the thought that substantial combina-
tions of the risks of affiliated corporations with those of unrelated
parties (risk pooling) within a wholly-owned insurance affiliate ef-
fectuates the transfer of the economic family's risks outside the
group. In other words, risk distribution can effectuate risk transfer.
The Service, in two publications, has indicated doubts as to its
own informal opinions. In Revenue Procedure 82-41,19" the Service
announced that it would not issue determination letters in this
area unless the facts of the transaction were within the confines of
Revenue Ruling 77-316, or Revenue Ruling 78-338.197 Furthermore,
in General Counsel Memorandum 39,247 the Service withdrew a
previous Memorandum that had indicated that a parent could
shift and distribute risk if forty to fifty percent of the captive's
premiums were from unrelated parties.19 8 In withdrawing the ear-
lier Memorandum, the Office of Chief Counsel stated:
Because our [previous] conclusion . . . is not consistent with the
position ultimately adopted by the Service .... [it] is revoked.
The captive insurance issue is now the subject of litigation in the
United States Claims Court in Mobil Oil ... and we will defer
further comment on this issue until that litigation is concluded.1 9
In the Mobil litigation, the U.S. Department of Justice clarified
this issue. The government asserted that the presence of third-
party insureds has no effect on the question of whether the eco-
nomic family has obtained insurance with its captive. 00 The view
is that risk transfer and risk distribution are two distinct, indepen-
dent principles as a matter of insurance theory.
The cases discussed above do not explain the logic behind the
distinction between risk transfer and risk distribution or why the
Service's informal opinions are incorrect in the captive insurance
setting. But the fallacy of the informal opinion position can easily
'" 1982-2 C.B. 761.
:97 Id.
" Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,247 (June 27, 1984), rev'g Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,136 (Oct. 12,
1979).
"' Id.
Brief for the United States at 74. The government's position in Mobil conflicted with
prior informal opinions issued by the Service. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying
text. The government could adopt this conflicting view because, even though informal Ser-
vice opinions are of public record, by statutory command they are given no precedential
value. See I.R.C. § 61100)(3).
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be exposed. The statement that the economic family has shifted its
risk outside the family to unrelated policyholders when its captive
insures unrelated parties is simply nonsensical. The risks of the
economic family are still retained by a subsidiary of the enterprise;
unrelated policyholders have shifted their risks to the captive, not
the other way around, because the unrelated policyholders have re-
ceived a contract of insurance from the captive that relieves them
of the financial uncertainty of their own risks and fixes the amount
of their potential losses at the amount of the premium. The cap-
tive, by accepting the risks of unrelated parties in addition to the
risks of its economic family, bears a larger number of risks. Indeed,
when one considers the financial impact on the economic family
with respect to its own risks, there is absolutely no difference
whether its captive accepts the risks of unrelated parties or only
handles its affiliates' risks.20 1
The theory that risk distribution effectuates risk transfer is
based on the mistaken view that the premiums of the unrelated
policyholders will somehow pay for the risks and claims of the eco-
nomic family. To believe that this could happen in the long run
supposes that unrelated policyholders will consent to consistent
overcharging for the coverage that they obtain. And, of course,
overcharging unrelated parties would result in a profit which the
captive would use to pay its own economic family's claims. 02 How-
ever, in reality, it is just as likely that the premiums of the eco-
nomic family will be used to pay the claims of the unrelated
parties.203
The informal opinion position is also based on the concept that,
by taking on the risks of unrelated parties, the risks borne by the
parent are reduced. This theory is the result of a misunderstanding
of risk distribution as a matter of insurance and economic theory,
and is not supported by any theoretical analysis. 20' Because of its
2:0 See supra notes 8-17 & 60-72 and accompanying texts.
20 See Greene, supra note 16, at 254.
203 Id. See, e.g., Captives Share Sour Underwriting Loss, Bus. Ins. 22 (Apr. 6, 1981).
204 Risk distribution is a function of the quantity and quality of the risks accepted and
retained by the insurance company. The pooling of a large number of independent but simi-
lar hazards brings into play the law of large numbers. While pooling increases the predict-
ability of the range in which the average loss will fall (the average loss being the total loss
over the number of policies), it also increases the total loss, decreases the predictability of
the total loss, and increases the probability of total disaster (a situation where total losses
exceed premiums and capital). This is the risk that the insurance company and its investors
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ownership and investment, the economic enterprise of affiliated
corporations bears the financial consequences of not only its own
losses, but of those of unrelated parties that its captive insures.
The only crucial difference between insuring oneself and adding
third parties is that the captive has entered into the insurance bus-
iness with respect to those third parties and receives a premium in
return for its bearing the financial consequence of the uncertain
losses, and the captive must commit additional capital or surplus
to do so. 20 5 But as far as the parent company's stockholders are
concerned, the financial condition of a company with self-insur-
ance and an insurance affiliate insuring third parties would be es-
sentially the same (disregarding tax consequences) as if the same
company used captive "insurance" with unrelated party busi-
ness,2" whereas the financial condition of that same company with
take in exchange for the potential profit they can earn. See generally R. Beard, T. Pen-
tikainen & E. Pesonen, Risk Theory 12-15 (2d ed. 1977); P. Samuelson, Risk and Uncer-
tainty: A Fallacy of Large Numbers, in 1 The Collected Scientific Papers of Paul A. Samuel-
son 153-58 (J. Stiglitz ed. 1966).
sob The capital and surplus (which represents profits earned by the company in prior
years) of an insurance company supplies a buffer against a situation where total losses ex-
ceed premiums. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the amount of capital of an
insurance company is a crucial element in determining the amount of business it is permit-
ted to underwrite under state regulatory provisions. Accordingly, the capital of an insurance
company is highly regulated by states. See, e.g., N.Y. Ins. Law §§ 107, 108, 1115, 1310, 4103
(McKinney 1985). Indeed, there is a direct relationship between the risks that an insurance
company underwrites and its capital and surplus. Under the guidelines of the National As-
sociation of Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC"), the ratio of premiums to surplus and capi-
tal is the first test for determining the financial well-being of an insurance company. See
Using the NAIC Insurance Regulatory Information Systems, Property/Liability Ed. 1982
(Jan. 1983). Congress has recognized these principles by allowing investment income of one-
third of earned premiums to escape Subpart F treatment for the following reasons:
In order to write insurance and accept reinsurance premiums, foreign insurance
companies may be required by the laws of various jurisdictions in which they operate
to meet various solvency requirements in addition to specified capital and legal re-
serve requirements. Many jurisdictions also employ an internal rule-of-thumb as to
what the ratio of surplus to earned premiums should be. In the United States, the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners employs a ratio of 1 to 3 (surplus to
earned premiums) as the guideline by which State regulatory agencies can measure
the adequate solvency of companies insuring casualty risks. If such a company's ratio
were less than 1 to 3, for instance 1 to 4, the State regulatory agency may question its
ability to accept additional risks. Surplus maintained in compliance with the 1 to 3
ratio, although not necessarily required by law, has been considered as ordinary and
necessary to the proper conduct of a casualty insurance business in the United States.
Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 94th Cong., 2d Seas., General Explanation of the Tax Re-
form Act of 1976, at 231 (1976). But see infra text following note 225.
I" As far as the economic family's stockholders are concerned, the fortunes of the group
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insurance provided by unrelated insurance companies would be
markedly different.
Thus, risk distribution in itself can never effectuate risk trans-
fer.207 Risk is not reduced by distribution; it is reduced by trans-
fer.2 08 The addition of risks leads to a larger potential, and less
certain, liability. Thus, it is not by pooling risks, but by subdivid-
ing risks, that one reduces risk potential.20 9 Because risk transfer is
and its captives are reported under the Accounting Practice Board requirements on a con-
solidated or equity basis, and its "insured" losses (or lack thereof) have a direct impact on
its financial condition. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
07 Distribution is not transfer; distribution by itself does not effectuate an essential ele-
ment of insurance. This was pointed out by Judge Rutledge in Jordan v. Group Health
Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1939); see supra text accompanying notes 126-28.
208 As Samuelson pointed out:
In short, it is not so much by adding new risks as by subdividing risks among more
people that insurance companies reduce the risk of each. To see this, do not double or
change at all the original number of ships insured by the company; but let each owner
sell half his shares to each new owner. Then the risk of loss to each owner per dollar
now in the company will have indeed been reduced.
Undoubtedly this is what my colleague really had in mind. In refusing a bet of $100
against $200, he should not then have specified a sequence of 100 such bets. That is
adding risks. He should have asked to subdivide the risk and asked for a sequence of
100 bets, each of which was 100th as big (or $1 against $2). If the money odds are
favorable and if we can subdivide the bets enough, any expected-utility-maximizer
can be coaxed into a favorable-odds bet-for the obvious reason that the utility func-
tion's curvature becomes more and more negligible in a sufficiently limited range
around any initial position. For sufficiently small bets we get more-than-a-fair game
in the utility space, and my basic theorem goes nicely into reverse.
Secondly, and finally, some economists have tried to distinguish between risk and
uncertainty in the belief that actuarial probabilities can reduce risk to a "virtual"
certainty. The limit laws of probability grind fine but they do not grind that exceed-
ing fine. I suspect there is often confusion between two similar-sounding situations.
One is the case where the owner of a lottery has sold out all the tickets; the buyers of
the tickets then face some kind of risky uncertainty, but the owner has completely
cancelled out his risks whatever the draw may show-which is not a case of risk as
against uncertainty, but really reflects a case of certainty without any risks at all.
Another case is that in which the management of Monte Carlo or of the "numbers
game" do business with their customers. The management makes sure that the odds
are in their favor; but they can never make sure that a run of luck will not go against
them and break the house (even though they can reduce this probability of ruin to a
positive fraction).
P. Samuelson, supra note 204, at 157.
09 Even though a risk may be unique, it can still be transferred as a practical matter if
the risk can be divided among several or many owners. The insurance does not make the
loss any less likely to happen, but, by dividing the risk, the insurer-owners have reduced
their percentage of the financial consequences of the total risk to a level which is bearable.
Captives generally obtain reinsurance from unrelated companies, recognizing that they too
need a bona fide transference of risk to another.
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essential to separating the financial risk of loss from the loss itself,
the courts are correct in rejecting the Service's informal opinions,
even though the analysis presented in the court opinions discussed
above is fairly superficial. The Service is also correct in aban-
doning the analysis in its informal opinions and treating risk trans-
fer and risk distribution as independent principles. This analysis
leads to the correct result that the presence of third-party in-
sureds, without more, does not change the underlying economic re-
ality of captive insurance.21
It is this principle which provides the basis for Revenue Ruling 78-338, 1978-2 C.B. 107,
108. The Ruling provides that a taxpayer has obtained insurance where there are 31 unre-
lated owners of an insurance company (the taxpayer is one owner) and no one owner's risk
coverage exceeds five percent of the total risk borne by the insurance company. In this
factual situation, there has been substantial subdivision of risk or transfer of each owner's
risk to the other owners.
110 With regard to the government's present position on third party business, one loose
end should be examined. A standard similar to the opinion expressed in the Private Letter
Rulings is employed in the Treasury Regulations under § 105.
Section 105(b) of the Code excludes certain employee accident and health benefits paid
by employers from the income of the employees. See I.R.C. § 105(b). Section 105(h) imposes
certain conditions on self-insured plans, namely that the benefits of § 105 not be available
to plans which discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees. See I.R.C. § 105(h).
Congress believed that a self-insurance arrangement provided greater opportunity for dis-
proportionate compensation for highly compensated employees, so it imposed additional re-
quirements on these plans. Thus, according to the Senate Finance Committee:
The bill applies only to an uninsured medical reimbursement plan, that is, a plan (or
a portion of a plan) under which benefits are not provided by a licensed insurance
company. Because underwriting considerations generally preclude or effectively limit
abuses in insured plans, the committee does not regard the bill as a precedent for the
treatment of insured health or accident plans.
S. Rep. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 186, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 6761, 6949.
The pertinent regulations specifically provide that a plan "that does not involve the shift-
ing of risk to an unrelated third party is considered self-insured for purposes of this sec-
tion." Tress. Reg. § 1.105-11(b)(ii). A plan written by a captive insurance company "is not
considered self-insured for purposes of this section" where 50% or more of the premiums
are derived from unrelated parties and the policies provided to the employees are similar to
those sold to the unrelated parties. Treas. Reg. § 1.105-11(b)(iii).
It is apparent that § 1.105-11(b)(iii) of the Regulations is an exception created under the
legislative rulemaking authority granted in § 105(h)(9) of the Code and is not a formal pro-
nouncement that a plan in compliance with this Regulation is actually insurance. It is clear
from the legislative purpose underlying the requirement in the Regulations that the Trea-
sury has concluded that the presence of over 50% of a captive's business derived from simi-
lar contracts issued to unrelated parties promotes the supremacy of underwriting considera-
tions and reduces the potential for abuse. Were the Regulation understood as a formal
pronouncement on what is insurance, there would be no reason for requiring that employ-
ees' policies be similar to those sold to unrelated parties. If an arrangement is considered to
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VI. CODE-BASED APPROACHES TO THE CAPTIVE INSURANCE
PROBLEM
A. Subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code
Subpart F of the Code taxes certain income derived from the
conduct of an insurance business to United States shareholders of
foreign insurance companies.2 " The application of these provisions
depends upon the characterization of captive insurance as insur-
ance212 and of the captive insurance company as an insurance com-
pany213 for federal income tax purposes. In Carnation Co. v. Com-
missioner, the Ninth Circuit specifically held that Subpart F did
not apply since none of the transactions involving the captive in-
be insurance because of unrelated party business, then an argument can easily be made that
the Regulation's requirement of similar policies is invalid, or at least superfluous.
Assuming, arguendo, that the Regulation presents a valid exercise of administrative au-
thority, what is its effect on the deductibility of premiums paid to a captive insurance com-
pany? It should have none. Under § 105, self-insured plans are not denied special treatment
unless they fail to meet certain conditions. The problem addressed by § 105 is not whether
a plan is self-insurance or insurance, but whether there is potential to use the plan to pro-
vide tax-free compensation on a discriminatory basis. Captive insurance that covers sub-
stantial outside risks and is issued to unrelated parties may eliminate this problem of abuse
as well as true insurance.
Section 162 is the provision under which the deductibility or nondeductibility of captive
insurance premiums should be addressed. The abuse perceived by courts and tax adminis-
trators is simply that taxpayers are attempting to deduct what is in reality self-insurance.
The economic reality or unreality of captive insurance is not affected by the presence of
unrelated party risks.
Thus, if a corporation that owned a major insurance company chose to "insure" with this
insurance company, the transactions would not be insurance, even if the majority of the
insurance company's business was with unrelated parties and the parent company's risks
were a small part of the total risks of the insurance company. Such a transaction would
merely represent a risk retention device, a fact well understood by corporate executives.
2 Only United States shareholders who own 10% or more of the voting stock of corpora-
tions that are controlled foreign corporations are subject to Subpart F. See I.R.C. § 951(a)-
(b). Generally, a controlled foreign corporation is one in which more than 50% of the voting
power of all the voting shares is owned by United States shareholders. See I.R.C. § 957(a).
A special rule includes certain insurance companies as controlled foreign corporations where
25% or more of the voting power or value of all classes of stock is owned by United States
shareholders and more than 75% of the gross amount of all premiums is derived from insur-
ance as defined in § 953(a)(1) of the Code. See I.R.C. § 957(b); see also infra note 225 and
accompanying text.
21 This would be for the purpose of determining whether the product was insurance
under the statute. See I.R.C. § 953(a).
213 This would be for the purpose of the pre-1987 special limitations on the inclusion of




Taxpayers have argued that Subpart F was meant to deal with
captive insurance arrangements and is the exclusive tool available
to the government.215 Though Subpart F would apply to captive
insurance, if it were insurance, the legislative history of the statute
indicates that Congress was concerned with a quite different prob-
lem: the avoidance of U.S. tax by insurance companies who,
through the use of foreign insurance companies, were either rein-
suring the business of their American affiliated insurance compa-
nies or were directly insuring United States risks.216 There is no
indication in the legislative history that Congress was aware of op-
erating companies attempting to deduct premiums paid to their
own insurance companies.21
Indeed, Congress has recently indicated twice that Subpart F
was not meant to deal directly with self-insurance of related par-
ties' United States risks by wholly-owned foreign insurance affili-
ates. In explaning its proposed amendments to Subpart F later en-
acted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1984,18 the Senate Finance
Committee stated:
In adopting this change, the committee recognizes that it is not
directly addressing all the problems associated with the use of con-
trolled foreign corporations as captive insurance companies in so-
phisticated self-insurance arrangements for related persons. The
committee does not intend that the provision be construed as af-
fecting any determination as to whether a payment made to a
related insurer constitutes self-insurance, the "premium" for which
is nondeductible.21
9
The Conference Report to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 also dis-
cusses the effect of some of the reported captive insurance cases.22
214 640 F.2d 1010, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 1981), aff'g 71 T.C. 400 (1978), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
965 (1981).
a" Carnation, 71 T.C. at 412.
, e See H.R. Rep. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 60-61 (1962); S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 81-82, reprinted in 1962 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3304, 3384-85.
:17 This is also the view of other authors. See O'Brien & Tung, supra note 18, at 720.
"' Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 137(a), 98 Stat. 494, 672 (codified at
I.R.C. § 954(e)).
219 Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Expla-
nation of Provisions Approved by the Committee on March 21, 1984, 1 S. Print No. 169, at
383-84.
20 See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 617-18 (1986).
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Subpart F, as one would expect, does not have the impact on
captive insurance that an absolute denial of a deduction has. The
denial of a deduction has a substantial impact on a U.S. taxpayer
even where the insurer is a U.S. corporation.22' Subpart F does not
deal with the deferral aspects of insurance versus self-insurance,
but with the deferral aspects of having a foreign insurance com-
pany as opposed to a domestic insurance company. The history of
Subpart F has shown a progressive effort by Congress to curtail
deferral. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 has made dramatic changes
to eliminate the deferral benefits of using a foreign insurer.
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the underwriting income of
a controlled foreign corporation from the insurance of U.S. risks
was currently taxed to its shareholders.222 Pursuant to the Tax Re-
form Act of 1984, Subpart F also included as foreign base company
income the underwriting income with respect to primary insurance
with a related party if the losses occur outside the country of in-
corporation of the insurance company.223 The earlier Senate Fi-
nance Committee Print indicated that "[tihis provision will apply
only if a valid insurance arrangement is found to exist. '22 4 Under
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, however, insurance income for pur-
poses of section 953 is now defined as any income from insurance
derived from risks arising outside the insurance company's place of
incorporation or organization. 225 The Act thus expands Subpart F's
coverage to unrelated parties' non-U.S. risks.
The investment income of the foreign captive is potentially for-
eign base company income, taxable to a U.S. shareholder under
Subpart F.226 Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, there were,
however, two principal exclusions for insurance companies. The
first was that investment income received from an unrelated party
that represents the investment of unearned premiums or reserves
221 For cases dealing with U.S. captives, see Stearns-Roger Corp. v. United States, 774
F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1985); Beech Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 1984-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 9803 (D. Kan. 1984), aff'd, 797 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1986); Crawford Fitting Co. v.
United States, 606 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
2 See I.R.C. §§ 951-953.
213 Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 137(a), 98 Stat. 494, 672 (codified at
I.R.C. § 954(e)).
:14 S. Print No. 169, supra note 219, at 384.
225 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1221(b)(1), 100 Stat. 2085, 2551 (to be
codified at I.R.C. § 953(a)(1)(A)).
222 See I.R.C. §§ 951, 952, 954.
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was not foreign base company income. 27 Additionally, income de-
rived from the investment of amounts representing one-third of
earned premiums (paid by unrelated parties only) was also ex-
cluded from foreign base company income. 28 Under the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986, however, these exclusions were repealed..22  Any
foreign base company income derived by the controlled foreign
corporation from foreign sources is foreign source income for pur-
poses of the foreign tax credit.
230
These rules of Subpart F were modified even further under the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 for certain captive insurance companies.
For the purpose of taking into account related party insurance in-
come, a U.S. shareholder is any U.S. citizen who owns any stock in
the insurance company, and a controlled foreign corporation is one
in which U.S. shareholders own twenty-five percent or more of the
company.231
There are three general exceptions to the captive insurance com-
pany rules. First, the provision does not apply where less than
twenty percent of the voting stock and value of the insurance com-
pany is owned by insureds or persons related to the insureds. Sec-
ondly, the provision does not apply where less than twenty percent
of the company's insurance income is derived from related parties.
Finally, where the insurance company elects to treat its related
party insurance income as effectively connected with a U.S. trade
or business, the captive insurance company rules do not apply.
23 2
The income of a controlled foreign corporation insurance com-
:2 See I.R.C. § 954(c)(3)(B).
,,8 See I.R.C. § 954(c)(3)(C).
*2 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1221(a)(1), 100 Stat. at 2549-50 (to be
codified at I.R.C. § 954(c)).
220 Subpart F income under § 951(a) is included as U.S. source income for foreign tax
credit purposes to the extent that the income is attributable to income derived by the U.S.-
owned foreign corporation from sources within the United States. See I.R.C.
§ 904(g)(1)(A)(i), (2). The legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1984 indicates that
Subpart F income derived from the insurance of U.S. risks previously would have been for-
eign source, thus permitting the U.S. owners potentially to "pay no U.S. tax and no foreign
tax on this artificially converted foreign source income" prior to the 1984 Act. H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 918, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
1445, 1606.
2s Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1221(b)(2), 100 Stat. at 2551 (to be
codified at I.R.C. § 953(c)(1)).
232 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1221(b)(2), 100 Stat. at 2551-52 (to be
codified at I.R.C. § 953(c)(3)).
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pany is determined on the basis of insurance accounting princi-
ples. 3 Thus, if captive insurance is respected for tax purposes,
Subpart F does not affect the tax advantages of captive insurance
versus self-insurance. However, the dramatic changes in Subpart F
made by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 minimize any tax advantage
for foreign captive insurance as compared with domestic captive
insurance.
If captive insurance is not recognized as insurance, the applica-
tion of Subpart F is limited to investment income of the captive.
This could have a substantial impact on taxation. Were the only
business of the captive the insurance of related parties, then the
captive would not be an insurance company taxable as such, be-
cause none of its business would be insurance.2 4 Thus, its invest-
ment income would be foreign base company income not subject to
any pre-Tax Reform Act of 1986 exclusions for insurance compa-
nies. Should the captive have unrelated business, it may still be
considered an insurance company and subject to Subpart F with
respect to that business.
B. Section 482 of the Code
Section 482 presents one of the government's principal tools for
examining the fairness of transactions between related parties.2 5
This tool has not been used by the government in any of the cap-
tive insurance cases so far because the government has made a
frontal attack on these arrangements by contending that they are
not insurance.2 3 6 Certainly, an examination of the transactions on
the basis of an arm's-length standard would depend on whether
the transactions were first accepted as insurance.
Were captive insurance considered insurance, however, section
482 would have to be considered. Section 482 gives the Secretary of
the Treasury broad powers to allocate income and deductions be-
tween related parties "in order to prevent evasion of taxes or
clearly to reflect the income 23 7 of such taxpayers. As provided in
the regulations:
See supra notes 19-37 and accompanying text.
' See Pariseau v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 984, 994 (1985).
:1 See I.R.C. § 482.
306 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
1 I.R.C. § 482.
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The purpose of section 482 is to place a controlled taxpayer on a
tax parity with an uncontrolled taxpayer, by determining, accord-
ing to the standard of an uncontrolled taxpayer, the true taxable
income from the property and business of a controlled taxpayer
. . . . The standard to be applied in every case is that of an uncon-
trolled taxpayer dealing at arm's length with another uncontrolled
taxpayer.2 "
The focus of section 482 with regard to captive insurance should
be on the fair pricing of the insurance product in a situation where
overpricing may be considered to provide a tax advantage. Viewing
captive insurance transactions through the looking glass of section
482, they may present some factors that deserve special considera-
tion. As mentioned earlier, captive insurance may provide several
non-tax advantages vis-a-vis traditional insurance: broader cover-
age than obtained in the market and insurance of otherwise unin-
surable risks.2 9 But the third and most important non-tax advan-
tage perceived for captive insurance is cost savings over traditional
insurance. 240 These factors require that pricing considerations be
focused upon to ensure that the taxpayer is not attempting to
evade taxes in contravention to section 482.
It is often perceived by some operating companies with a
favorable insurance record that commercial insurance carriers do
not give sufficient consideration to favorable loss experience in set-
ting an insurance rate.241 Certainly a captive could take such expe-
rience into account. Assuming as a starting point, however, that
the management of the affiliated group sets an insurance rate
based on a perception of what the commercial insurance market
would charge for coverage, 42 should a more favorable claims ratio
be a factor in reducing the rate charged in a captive insurance
transaction?
For example, in Mobil, the government submitted an analysis of
loss experience of the Mobil captive insurance companies versus
238 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1).
3, See Greene, supra note 16, at 254.
:40 Id.
41 Id.
242 Indeed, one study on captive insurance found that "most captives seem to be using
manual or tariff rates in writing the owner/controller risks, regardless of the modification to
the rate which the risk would have commanded in the market." Goshay, supra note 7, at
104.
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that of U.S.-based stock reinsurance companies. The study showed
the loss experience of the former to be much lower than that of the
latter. 43 Such results could be the consequence of many factors,
including overpricing, good luck, reduced claims adjustment ex-
pense, better loss control by the insured, or an attempt to accumu-
late reserves for catastrophic losses. Price adjustments based on
favorable loss ratios may be quite difficult in practice to
determine.
General expenses of a captive insurer may also be considerably
lower than expenses for a commercial insurer. This can be due to
the fact that little or no expense need be incurred for acquisition
of the insurance business (commissions and brokers' fees) and gen-
eral administration and claims investigation expenses can be mini-
mal in a controlled situation. For example, Mobil prepared a study
which compared the general expenses of one of its captive insur-
ance companies with general expenses incured by U.S. stock insur-
ance companies. The general expenses of the former were dramati-
cally lower than those of the latter.
2 4
Expense savings resulting from lower loss costs and lower gen-
eral expenses can result in higher underwriting profits. In Mobil,
the government elaborated on the results of the two studies men-
tioned above to make the point that the Mobil captive insurers
were much more profitable than a typical U.S. stock insurance
company.24 These factors suggest that the Service arguably should
look very carefully at pricing considerations when examining a cap-
tive insurance relationship under section 482. Pricing that is "in
line" with typical insurance policies may still deserve special atten-
tion, due to the expense and profit experience discovered in Mobil.
The Secretary might propose downward adjustments to the pre-
mium rates under section 482 based on the view that these types of
savings represent special circumstances which would be taken into
consideration in an arm's-length price. Indeed, one commentator
has reported that the Service has used section 482 in this man-
ner. 2 46 It should be noted, however, that section 482 was not raised
'" For an exhibit prepared by the government's expert, Dr. Irving Plotkin, illustrating
this analysis, see infra at p. 325 (Table I).
.. For Mobil's exhibit illustrating this relation, see infra at p. 326 (Table II).
""' For the government's illustration of this point, using an exhibit prepared by Dr.
Plotkin, see infra at p. 327 (Table III).
"I See Kloman, The Evolution of the Bermuda Captive, 19 Risk Mgmt. 14 (1972).
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in Mobil. The court, however, did comment on these factors:
The expenses for GOIC and Bluefield, wholly-owned insurance
affiliates, were considerably lower than expenses of an unrelated
insurance company. GOIC and Bluefield did not generally pay
commissions in respect to their direct insurance. Administrative
expenses were also less. In terms of commercial insurance expecta-
tions, GOIC's and Bluefield's profits were extraordinarily high.
2 4 7
The court did not go on to make any finding to the effect that the
premiums charged were fair and reasonable.2 48
Thus, should taxpayers prevail on the captive insurance issue,
the Service should subject their captive insurance operations to
careful scrutiny and challenge under section 482.
VII. CONCLUSION
Federal courts have had many recent opportunities to consider
the captive insurance phenomenon. From these decisions, a trend
has been clearly established: an economic family of corporations
does not obtain true insurance coverage from its own insurance af-
filiate. This result, however, was not foreordained because of the
reliance on traditional substance-over-form and sham transaction
tax doctrines and the uncertainty that is fundamental in their ap-
plication. But the trend established in recent captive insurance
cases was predictable due to the large potential for tax avoidance
with captive insurance transactions and because such insurance is
essentially a risk-retention device. The trend advanced by the
courts' opinions, and the opinions themselves, serve as a general
guideline to taxpayers that captive insurance is subject to the test
of economic reality.
In spite of the recent court attention to the captive insurance
issue, several questions regarding partial ownership of a captive in-
surer and the effect of third-party insureds on the question of
whether insurance is present remain unsettled. As demonstrated in
this article, however, economic and insurance theory indicate that
the presence of unrelated party business has no effect on whether
insurance exists between the parent organization and its captive.
Thus, tax planners should be aware that unrelated party business
147 8 Cl. Ct. at 559.
s Id. at 568.
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is not the panacea it was once perceived to be. The application of
economic theory also indicates that to the extent the insured owns
the insurer, risk has not been transferred. Therefore, this article
argues that when an insurance company is partially owned by an
insured, the insured's premium is not for insurance to the extent of
the percentage of the insured's premium that reflects the insured's
ownership of the insurer.
However, arguments based on pure economic theory with regard
to partial ownership have been limited by the Service. Where con-
trol and significant ownership are lacking, the taxpayer has in fact
transferred a large portion of the risk covered by the contract and
the transaction bears only partial resemblance to classic self-insur-
ance. Control is inherently a factual problem which cannot be de-
termined by absolute percentages of ownership. Despite the hold-
ing in Crawford Fitting, it appears the issue is not resolved.
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Defendant's Exhibit No. 354, at Table 28, Mobil Oil Corp. v.
United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 555 (1985) (No. 358-78) (copy on file). The
data contained in this exhibit for industry comparisons was ob-























GOIC Stock GOIC Stock
Acquisition 1.0 25.0 1.0 28.0
General Administration 0.6 8.5 0.6 6.5
Inspection + Bordereaux 0.0 4.5 0.0 2.5
Premium Taxes 0.0 3.0 0.0 3.0
Loss Expense 0.3 7.0 0.3 4.2
Total Expense 1.9 48.0 1.9 44.2
Permissible Loss Ratio 47.0 47.0 50.8 50.8
Expected Profit 51.1 5.0 47.3 5.0
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 483, Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States, 8 Cl.




Adjusted Underwriting Profit Margin




































Defendant's Exhibit No. 354, at Table 31, Mobil Oil Corp. v.
United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 555 (1985) (No. 358-78) (copy on file).
Year
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
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